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THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ERA: A BICENTENNIAL COMPARATIVE




The expansion of constitutionalism is one of the most interesting
phenomena of our time. Since World War II, a great number of states
have either adopted new constitutions or changed their constitutional
systems. The process of constitutional development was particularly
intensified through the emergence of the socialist countries and the
new states in Asia, Africa and the Near East.'
The post-war constitutional experiences were, for the most part,
dissatisfying. Without the extra-parliamentary means of constitu-
tional control, the constitutions of the socialist countries operated
more like political-philosophical declarations than legally binding
norms. Most of the constitutions of the new third world countries
were copied from previous, well-tested constitutional structures with-
out regard to their applicability to the unique geopolitical circum-
stances in which the new states had emerged. The successes of these
new constitutional systems were short-lived. The political structures
of the countries that emerged due to the collapse of colonialism during
the 1950s and 1960s were subject to frequent and substantial transfor-
mation which, contrary to popular expectations, usually resulted in
the establishment of a form of military government.
Experts studying the processes of political transformation observe
that the successful transfer of power or the emergence of new centers
of political responsibility require a vast knowledge of the social, eco-
* Dr. Rett R. Ludwikowski is Professor of Law at the Catholic University of America Co-
lumbus School of Law, and Director of the Comparative and International Law Institute.
1. H. SPIRO, GOVERNMENT BY CONSTITUTION 5-6 (1959). As Albert P. Blaustein pointed
out, "Of the world's 162 existing constitutions (approximately 20 of which are presently "sus-
pended"), only 15 were promulgated prior to World War It and only 14 more date from before
1960. The pre-war constitutions are United States (1789), Norway (1814), Belgium (1831), Libe-
ria (1847 suspended), Argentina (1853), Luxembourg (1868), Switzerland (1874), Colombia
(1886), Australia (1901), Mexico (1917), Finland (1919), Austria (1920), Liechtenstein (1921),
Lebanon (1926 inoperative), and Ireland (1937)." A. BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 33 n.25 (1986).
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nomic, cultural and geopolitical circumstances in which the new insti-
tutions are to be installed. Successful constitutional engineering also
requires advanced comparative technique to help locate political de-
vices applicable to unique combinations of local factors. The compar-
ative method is an indispensable tool for successful. constitution-
making. To accomplish his goal, the constitutional engineer must not
only study the context in which the examined constitutional system
operates, but also the historical circumstances in which it was adopted
and in which it functioned. Successful constitutions have deep roots in
constitutional traditions and in the political and legal culture of the
nations that have completed the constitution-making process. 2 Since
1960, over 100 new constitutions have been promulgated. Most of
these constitutions copied (or adopted) some features of the constitu-
tions recognized as models in constitutional scholarship, such as the
U.S. Constitution, the French Constitution, the famous Spanish Con-
stitution of 1812 and others. Furthermore, it can be argued that suc-
cessful and long-lasting political structures are usually the legacy of
more than one nation; an examination of cross-national intellectual,
political, and cultural ties and interrelations therefore requires
profound historical knowledge. For the constitutional engineer, com-
parative historical studies may provide new and deeper insights into
the constitutional structures should be adopted.
Of the earliest written constitutions, the survival of the American
Constitution and its contribution to the development of constitutional
institutions has been most widely studied - a fact that does not re-
quire confirmation. As Albert Blaustein wrote, "[t]he United States
Constitution is the nation's most important export. It was meant to
be; it has been since even before its promulgation; and it continues to
be. It could not help but be, and it cannot help but be.
' '3
This great Constitution did not emerge, however, in a philosophi-
cal and political vacuum. It was rooted not only in the American co-
lonial experience and in the British constitutional tradition, but also
grew out of centuries of European constitutional history. The devel-
opment of the American Constitution was influenced by other consti-
tutions adopted at the end of the eighteenth century, and the
American Constitution had a great deal of force on the development of
the constitutional structures in other countries. Through the Polish
Constitution of May 3, 1791, the basic idea of constitutionally limited
power spread over Eastern Europe. The short-lived French Constitu-
2. See Kirk, Edmund Burke and the Constitution, 21 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 3 (1985-86).
3. A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1.
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tion of September 3, 1791, influenced the Spanish Constitution of 1812
and Norway's Constitution of 1814,4 which became models for many
Latin American and Scandinavian constitutions.5 For the prospective
constitutional architect who examines the conditions of constitutional
success, an exploration of the diffusion process of constitutional ideas
in the beginning of the constitutional era may be very instructive.
The bicentennial of the framing of the American Constitution and
the bicentennial of the French Revolution bring to mind several reflec-
tions. Although American and French politics at the end of the eight-
eenth century have been carefully examined, the links between the
constitutional developments of both countries have never been
researched exhaustively. The reasons seem to be threefold. First, with
the exceptions of the American Constitution and the Polish Constitu-
tion of May 3, 1791, the French Constitution of September 3, 1791
preceded all other written constitutions in the world, and the influence
of the French Act on European constitutions seems to be the primary
focus of attention of the European constitutional experts. Second, the
sequence in which the American and French Constitutions were
adopted naturally favored the claim of American parentage of the
French Act. This conclusion seemed to undermine the originality of
the French Constitution and irritate the historians who believed that'
the key ideas of the French constitutional documents were rooted in
the philosophy of the French Enlightenment. Third, the American
draftsmen emphasized the continuity of their constitutional works and
eventually looked for roots in British rather than French constitu-
tional ideas and traditions. For these reasons, the American contribu-
tion to the process of drafting the French revolutionary acts, such as
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the subsequent
influence of the Declaration on American constitutional development
- particularly the formation of the American Bill of Rights - has
never received adequate attention.
This article is intended only to be introductory. 6 The author is
quite aware that the period surrounding the creation of the American
4. The document has been amended many times but its principal features remain unchanged.
It makes Norway's Constitution the second oldest operative constitution in the world.
5. Kirk, supra note 2, at 8-9.
6. This article is an introduction to a book-length comparative study on the beginning of the
constitutional era, which will be published by the Miller Center at the University of Virginia.
For the first part of this study, focusing on the American Constitution and the Polish Constitu-
tion of May 3, 1791, see Ludwikowski, Two Firsts. A Comparative Study of the American and the
Polish Constitutions, 8 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 117 (1987). The chapter on the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and its influence on the constitutions was prepared
as a paper for the XIIIth Congress of Comparative Law in Montreal, August 1990. It will be
published in American Journal of Comparative Law
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Constitution has been profoundly studied; thorough analysis has been
provided concerning both the origin and historical development of the
American Constitution, as well as the intellectual background of the
"founding generation." Characteristically, these studies have focused
on the "American constitutional tradition," which means that they
have been limited to little more than two centuries of colonial experi-
ence. This essay follows a different vein of inquiry., The author's pur-
pose is not to add another article to the numerous works already
devoted to American constitutional development. Rather, the focus of
this work is on France. The first part of the article concentrates on the
period in which the British colonies had not yet been established or
when their organization was in embryo; this part will focus mostly on
French constitutional traditions as compared to English traditions,
and traditions of Poland - the first European country to adopt a writ-
ten constitution. The ensuing parts compare the intellectual back-
ground of the framers of the American and French Constitutions,
central principles of those documents, and their impact on the consti-
tutional developments in both countries.
I. FRANCE: ABSOLUTISM V. CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS
Those who claim that lengthy constitutional traditions are of fun-
damental importance for constitution-making will find France at odds
with their argument. France's approximately two centuries of absolu-
tism appears to contradict the thesis that a lengthy constitutional his-
tory was a constitutive element of the creative process of the first
written constitutions. If the constitutional history of a country begins
when institutions and procedures have been established to limit the
power of government, it must be admitted that France's attempts to
impose efficient restraints on the exercise of the king's power were not
particularly successful when compared to the Anglo-American consti-
tutional traditions.
Whereas the United States Constitution arose from the roots of
British constitutional experience, 7 the Anglo-American constitutional
tradition can be traced back to the adoption of the Magna Carta in
1215, the Petition of Rights in 1628, the Bill of Rights in 1689 and the
Act of Settlement in 1700.8 We can examine the leading ideas of con-
stitutional government by studying British judicial decisions and con-
stitutional conventions, and by analyzing the evolution and
7. See Kirk, supra note 2, at 4.
8. Poole, The Publication of Great Charters by the English Kings, 28 ENG. HIST. REV. 444
(1913).
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breakdown of a colonial experience that concluded with the formation
of the American constitutional movement at the end of the eighteenth
century.9
The sixteenth century was a particularly crucial period for the es-
tablishment of royal authority in England. Under the reign of the
Tudors, England experienced the golden age of her absolutism. How-
ever, the concept of absolute sovereignty was mitigated by the English
doctrine that the king is beneath the law and that the supreme power
is vested not in the king alone, but in the "king in parliament." The
principle "lex facit regem" acknowledged that the king was a "foun-
tain of justice," but required him to be bound by the law which was
enacted by himself and his council. The seventeenth century brought
more restraints on the exercise of royal authority in England,' 0 and
the political system of the country began to diverge more distinctly
from the model of French absolutism.
In comparison, the monarchy in Poland - the other European
country of mature constitutional traditions - was neither hereditary
nor absolute. The elective king was not "divinely appointed,"
although in theory it was assumed that God directed the electorate
during each election. Theoretically, the monarch was answerable to
no one save God, but in practice his power was effectively limited by
the vast privileges of the gentry and the activity of the gentry's repre-
sentation. 1' As in England, the power was vested in the "king in par-
liament" and the king was required to rule justly, but the Polish
nobility worked out much stronger instruments for the application of
their standards to the concept of royal justice. When English absolu-
tism reached its peak and the French monarchy built the potential to
surpass the hampering restraints on the exercise of royal authority, the
drive towards absolutism in Poland was losing its momentum.
The position of the French king in the sixteenth century was al-
ready distinguishable from that of the English and Polish monarchs.
The king was above human law and could override both parliament
and custom. 12 On the other hand, as Jean Bodin argued, the monarch
was bound both by the law of God and by natural law. ' 3 The royal
authority was also limited by the fundamental laws of the kingdom
9. For a more detailed analysis of American constitutional traditions, see generally M.
HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1826 (1939); C.
SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1943).
10. See E. WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 231-33 (9th ed. 1977).
11: See Ludwikowski, supra note 6, at 118-30.
12. D. PARKER, THE MAKING OF FRENCH ABSOLUTISM 1 (1983).
13. E. KNAPTON, FRANCE: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 132 (1971).
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dealing with royal domain and succession. The king was the sovereign
monarch, and as Bodin declared, "sovereignty is the absolute and per-
petual power of a commonwealth ... that is to say, the greatest power
to command."' 4 The king's absolutism was to be restrained only by
the contracts he made with his people, by his Christian virtues which
required him to rule justly, and by the voluntary restraints he accepted
to enhance the prestige and stability of the monarchy. As Parker
argued,
It was generally agreed in the early sixteenth century that royal author-
ity [in France] was both absolute and limited: absolute inasmuch as the
king was divinely appointed and answerable to no one save God, yet
limited in the sense that his prime task was to rule justly in accordance
with precepts of divine and natural justice.' 5
The extent of royal authority was increased in both France and
England by the advanced process of unifying the realm. The princi-
pality of Wales was annexed by England in the fourteenth century and
English domination in Ireland was firmly established by the Poyning's
Law of 1494. Scotland was still a separate kingdom, but after 1603
one monarch ruled in both countries. Finally, the kingdom of Great
Britain was formed by the union of England and Scotland in 1707.
The royal domain in France also increased considerably in the second
half of the fifteenth century, especially when Anjou, Maine, and Pro-
vence were added to the Crown.' 6 Brittany remained a semi-in-
dependent province, but was finally incorporated with France in 1532.
The trend to consolidate royal authority in Poland was less suc-
cessful. The unification of the country in the late thirteenth and early
fourteenth century was followed by the union with Lithuania in 1395,
but both countries retained separate treasuries, administrations, and
judiciaries. Even after the union of 1569, which formally established
the Polish Commonwealth as one state, the process of unification was
far from complete. The unifying efforts of the Polish kings were coun-
terbalanced by the attempts of the Polish magnates - "kinglets" as
they were called - who retained private armies, courts and their own
clientele. Hence, contrary to England, France, and Austria, Poland
gradually became a grouping of (landed estates) ruled by individual
magnates.17 The magnates won the struggle with the gentry's move-
ment and in the seventeenth century successfully affected the elections
14. 1 J. BODIN, LES Six LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE [Six Books on the Republic] 122
(1683).
15. D. PARKER, supra note 12, at 1.
16. See E. KNAPTON, supra note 13, at 97.
17. See A. GIEYSZTOR, S. KIENIEWicz, E. ROSTWOROWSKI, J. TAZBIR & H. WERESZYCKI,
HISTORY OF POLAND 224 (1968) [hereinafter A. GIEYSZTOR & S. KIENIEWICZ].
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and controlled the budget of the kingdom. Their relatively independ-
ent position frequently weakened their loyalty to the king and to the
country.
In England, the successful financial arrangements at the end of the
fifteenth century increased the income drawn from Crown lands, feu-
dal dues, customs and profits from justice, which helped the monarchy
rely more on its own revenues. The old feudal nobility had been deci-
mated during the War of the Roses. The rising new gentry and aris-
tocracy were largely dependent on the king, whose court offered them
offices and social esteem. Hence, even though the principle of "no
taxation without representation" gradually gained broad recognition,
the monarch never became as dependent on the gentry's parliament as
he was in Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
In France, absolutism also won its struggle with the magnates (les
grands) and the old feudal nobility (noblesse d'epie). A number of
high-ranking nobles were indicted for treason during the fifteenth cen-
tury, some of whom were executed. With the establishment of the
gendarmerie, it became treasonable to raise an army without royal per-
mission.18 In the beginning of the seventeenth century the remnants
of the old nobility tried to revolt against the monarchy, but were un-
successful.19 The new office-holding nobility was more closely linked
to the court and supported the royal budget through the purchases of
offices generously sold by the king since the beginning of sixteenth cen-
tury. The burden of taxation was, however, placed on the commoners.
Direct taxes were paid mostly by the peasants, while the burden of
indirect taxes was placed on the peasants and townspeople together.20
The budgetary arrangements overburdened the third estate and to
some extent reduced the royal income. On the other hand, the budget-
ary arrangements made the French king much less dependent on the
nobility.21
18. D. PARKER, supra note 12, at 25.
19. See A. LUBLINSKAYA, FRENCH ABSOLUTISM: THE CRUCIAL PHASE 1620-1629, at 330
(1968).
20. The nobility paid direct taxes only in Languedoc and Provence. See Id. at 227-28. Im-
portant parts of the budgetary income were internal and external customs dues and levies. Id. at
228.
21. Some historians of French absolutism emphasize that growth of the king's authority dur-
ing the seventeenth century was due to the royal capacity of controlling the economic and polit-
ical crisis of the seventeenth century and explain most of the social and political phenomena
typical of the seventeenth century against the background of economic transformations. See R.
MOUSNIER, LES XVIE ST. XVIIE SIECLES. LES PROGRES DE LA CIVILIZATION EUROPEENEE
ET LA DECLINE DE L'ORIENT (1492-1715) (1954). Others, such as H. R. Trevor-Roper, argue
that the development of events in Europe during the seventeenth century can be explained by
analyzing the series of political revolutions which affected life in the major European countries
(the Puritan Revolution in England, the Fronde in France, the coup d'etat of 1649 in the Nether-
lands, the Cossacks' Revolt in Poland in 1648, the revolts in Catalonia and Portugal in 1640, the
Fall 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Another attribute of the growing royal power in France and Eng-
land was the king's ability to control and exploit urban communities.
This was not so in Poland, where the supremacy of the gentry signifi-
cantly reduced towns' independent development. In Poland, towns lo-
cated within the magnates' latifundia were subject to the magnates'
increased exploitation. The royal towns were under the administra-
tion of the kings' officials - the starostas - who drew handsome prof-
its from the exploitation of the townspeople. 22 Generally speaking, the
Polish towns were not strong enough to offer valuable financial sup-
port for the weakening royal authority. In England and France, how-
ever, expanded West European trade enriched the towns and made
them valuable sources of additional royal income which was drawn
from loans or taxes. The nobility and clergy remained highly privi-
leged, but the towns won their independent administration while the
wealthy bourgeoisie became a valuable partner for the Crown. The
king supported the development of commercial capitalism and used
the merchants' capital to break down the magnates' opposition to
absolutism.
23
An additional attribute of the growing royal power in France was
the successful control of church-state relations. The French monarchy
observed with keen interest the general development of the Reforma-
tion in Europe, with primary focus on England. The severance of
bonds with Rome was followed by serious religious turbulance that
lasted at least one and a half centuries in England. Unrest enfeebled
the Church, which had not become an independent religious institu-
tion. Even the accession of power by the Hanoverian dynasty, which
seemed to calm down the religious conflicts, did not restore the pres-
tige of the Church. On the other hand, separation from Rome
strengthened the absolutist aspirations of Tudor kings. The monarch,
who became "Supreme Head of the English Church" controlled
Church nominations, and with the support of Parliament, was able to
increase the financial burden of the Church. Submission by the clergy
to the king's law and appeals from the bishop's courts to the king in
chancery, firmly established royal supremacy in all spiritual and eccle-
siastical matters.
In France, the Gallican Church managed its own affairs relatively
near revolt in Andalusia in 1641 and others). See Trevor-Roper, The General Crisis of the Seven-
teenth Century, in PAST AND PRESENT (no. 16, 1959); see also A. LUBLINSKAYA, supra note 19,
at 82-102. The representatives of both schools usually admit that the French monarchy was
capable of overcoming both the political and economic crises of the seventeenth century.
22. See A. GIEYSZTOR & S. KIENIEWICZ, supra note 17, at 227.
23. See A. LUBLINSKAYA, supra note 19, at 29.
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independent of papal interference. It gave the king the opportunity to
strengthen royal control over Church nominations, ecclesiastical juris-
diction, and church income without official separation from Rome.
Gallicans who viewed the Church as more "French" than "Roman"
considered the king to be the protector of their rights.24 Since the
confrontation between Philip IV the Fair and Pope Boniface VII at the
turn of the thirteenth century, the clergy was taxed by the king with-
out papal consent. 25 At that time, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was re-
duced. Traditionally, ecclesiastical courts adjudicated a variety of
cases having a non-spiritual character - primarily those dealing with
property involving the Church and feudal obligations to which the
Church was a party. "In addition, the Church had complete control
over litigation relating to heresy, sorcery, widows and illegitimate chil-
dren, marriage and disputes between clerics. Gradually the areas of
competence were reduced, a process helped by the increasing readiness
of the clergy to appeal to the royal courts."
'26
At the end of the fourteenth century only matters dealing with
faith (excommunication, interdiction, the sacraments) remained in the
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts; the royal courts even began to hear
cases involving the sacrament of marriage. Later, at the end of the
fifteenth century, ecclesiastical justice was almost totally subordinated
to royal supervision. 27 The Concordat of Bologna (1515) stated that
the pope would install archbishops, bishops and abbots after prior
nomination by the monarchy. Also, France did not officially incorpo-
rate the final decrees of the Council of Trent (1563), which seemed to
be aimed at the Gallican Liberties. 28 Furthermore, in 1682, an assem-
bly of French clergy issued the famous statement of Gallican Liberties
that emphasized royal sovereignty in temporal matters, limitation of
control by Rome over the French Church by the Gallican "constitu-
tions, rules and customs," and general subordination of the pope to
the Church even in regard to questions of faith. The statement, con-
demned by Pope Innocent XI, was never officially rejected by the
monarchy. "Thus, while Gallicanism had been officially condemned
in Rome, it continued to be, in fact, the practice in France. '29
The monarchy successfully abolished the political independence of
24. See E. KNAPTON, supra note 13, at 5.
25. See D. PARKER, supra note 12, at 4.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
28. See E. KNAPTON, supra note 13, at 147.
29. Id. at 208. After 1690 the so-called Articles of Gallican Liberties ceased to be taught in
French seminars.
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the Huguenots who, as Cardinal Richelieu confessed in his Political
Testament "shared the state with the king."' 30 The Edict of Nantes of
1598, which proclaimed that the Protestants would not be "molested
because of faith," was revoked by the Edict of Fontainbleau of 1685.
Protestant worship was forbidden. This caused almost a quarter of a
million Protestants to leave France.31 For a long time the emigration
of Protestants was recognized as a major cause of the French eco-
nomic decline. Current research challenges this view and points out
that "a severe economic decline must be explained in the light of com-
plex factors, among them the severe natural disasters affecting agricul-
ture, the heavy cost of the wars and the failure of Colbert's successors
to carry out successfully the policies which he had envisaged."' 32 It is
argued that, while France suffered economically and even militarily,
33
the royal administration's control over society increased when the
Protestants' independent centers were broken. The persecution of
Protestants seemed to be a weapon that cut both ways: on the one
hand it contributed to economic hardship in France, while on the
other hand, some Catholics took advantage of the Huguenot migration
and the Catholic monarchy strengthened control over both the Galli-
can Church and society, which became more homogeneously Catholic.
Once again, a comparison with Poland clearly shows how impor-
tant successful control by royal authority of church-state relations was
to the formation of French absolutism. In Poland, the special and
privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church was also under-
mined in the sixteenth century. In 1551 the Polish bishops relin-
quished their jurisdiction over laymen for one year in matters of faith
(causae spirutuales and causaes spritualibus annexae). Until then, ec-
clesiastical execution of court decisions had been placed in the discre-
tion of the king's district administration (starostas). In 1563-1565, the
ecclesiastical courts were deprived of the lay execution that had been
recognized as the official introduction of full religious toleration. In
fact, matters of faith remained outside royal jurisdiction, but decisions
of the ecclesiastical courts were not observed by the nobility without
the support of the king's administration. 34 The gentry movement dur-
30. Quoted in E. KNAPTON, supra note 13, at 156.
31. Id. at 209.
32. Id. at 209. For more detailed analysis of the impact of the persecution of the Protestants
in France, see W. SCOVILLE, THE PERSECUTION OF HUGUENOTS AND FRENCH ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT, 1680-1720 (1960).
33. It is estimated that nine thousand sailors and twelve thousand trained soldiers deserted
their posts as a result of the crackdown imposed on the Protestants.
34. See 2 Z. KACZMARCZYK & B. LESNODORSKI, HISTORIA PANSTWA I PRAWA POLSKI
[History of the Polish Law and State] 82-83 (1966).
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ing the Reformation period demanded that the Church become
subordinate to the state and that the laymen's religious contributions
be reduced. The concept of "inexpensive church" coincided with the
gentry's struggle for a national Polish church. The attempts to estab-
lish a separate Church of Poland were unsuccessful, although these
efforts strongly affected the independent position of the Roman Catho-
lic hierarchy in Poland. As a result of the religious turbulence during
the Reformation, the Catholic Church remained predominant, but the
policy of religious toleration gained an upper hand.35
Thus, the weakened Polish monarchy was not able to use the Ref-
ormation movements to gain control over the Church. In fact, Lu-
theranism spread among the Polish burghers and Calvinism became
popular among the Polish aristocracy, which found theocratic ele-
ments of Calvin's doctrine in the confirmation of their independence
from the religiously alien monarchy. 36 The combination of the strong
links of the Polish Catholic Church with Rome and general religious
toleration affected royal authority in Poland. The loyalty of the Cath-
olic hierarchy to the king was strongly impaired by the links with
Rome. The Polish prelates lacked the feeling that the king was their
sole protector. The powerful Protestant magnates were linked by reli-
gious and family ties to foreign rather than Polish royal families. Ca-
tholicism in Poland remained strong primarily due to the attachment
of the gentry and peasantry to this religion, however, the Church was
never a reliable ally of the monarchy, as it was in England and France.
It is therefore apparent that the monarchy in France was both ab-
solute and limited. So far, we have focused on the factors that contrib-
uted to the growth of royal authority. Now we will examine those few
elements that worked for the apparently self-contradictory concept of
"limited absolutism."
During the Renaissance, voluntary restraints were placed upon the
monarchs in France. These restraints lessened tensions between abso-
lutist tendencies represented by the royal administration and constitu-
tional tendencies stemming from the growth of representative
institutions. It was widely agreed that even if the king was capable of
overriding opposition in the representative and judiciary organs, a per-
manent conflict with those institutions would damage his image as a
Christian monarch who did not abuse the divine and natural laws.
35. Except for the anti-Arian crackdown by Sigismund-Augustus, religious persecution was
almost unknown in Poland. The formal status of non-Catholic churches was regulated officially
by the Warsaw Confederation of 1573. See id. at 84.
36. See A. GIEYSZTOR & S. KIENIEWICZ, supra note 17, at 186.
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Confronted with this problem, the monarch attempted to control the
growth of the representative institutions.
"There was in France, as in England," wrote David Parker, "a
tradition of 'taking wise counsel' by assembling the chief vassals of the
crown when appropriate; in addition it was generally, albeit somewhat
vaguely, supposed that those who contributed to the necessities of the
king should have a voice on the matter."' 37 The French Estates-Gen-
eral began meeting in the beginning of the fourteenth century shortly
after the establishment of the English parliament at the end of the
thirteenth century.
38
The origins of the French Estates-General have long been a subject for
debate. Whether one goes back to the Concilium Trium Galliarum of
the Placitum Generale of Pre-Capetian France or chooses to emphasize
either the feudal duties of aid and counsel or the Roman Law theories of
Plena Potestas and Quod omnes tanget; whether one finds a new depar-
ture in 1302 or chooses to say that the Estates-General did not take its
completed form until 1484, the fact remains that by the late fifteenth
century the French kings had permitted the development of an institu-
tion that allowed the representatives of certain groups to present their
complaints to the king in return for their support of royal policy or the
collection of new taxes.39
At the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, both in Eng-
land and in France, even the growing income from the royal domain
was not sufficient to provide for the needs of the kingdom, not even
during time of peace. 40 To solve these problems, the kings of both
countries looked for "wise council" from their vassals and especially
for their support for more extended taxation. While in England tradi-
tions of taking counsel contributed to the steady growth of the role of
Parliament, in France, the Estates-General was summoned irregularly,
mostly during periods of the abatement of the king's authority. The
attempts of the successors of Phillip IV the Fair to get more perma-
nent support from the Estates for additional taxation were unsuccess-
ful. The Estates' resistance, combined with a willingness to take
advantage of the weakness of the king, worked against the establish-
ment of a continued practice of periodical use of the central assem-
blies.4' The principle that taxation and representation are inseparable,
37. D. PARKER, supra note 12, at 14.
38. In 1295 the English King Edward 1, in need of popular support for his policy, reverted to
the practice of Simon de Montfort from 1265 and summoned both the representatives of knights
and boroughs. This often has been recognized as the transition of the feudal council into the
national representative body.
39. J.M. HAYDEN, FRANCE AND THE ESTATES-GENERAL OF 1614, at 4-5 (1974).
40. See J.R. MAJOR, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 12
(1980).
41. See id. at 12-30; see also D. PARKER, supra note 12, at 15.
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which strengthened the permanent character of the Polish and English
parliaments, never won support in France.42 During the sixteenth
century, the Estates-General was convened only four times (1560,
1576, 1588 and 1593) in periods of fiscal and political necessity, and
between 1614 and 1789 this body was not called at all.
43
Despite the Estates-General's failure to become a regularly repre-
sentative institution, it did establish some traditions and rituals in
presenting grievances to the king. The decline of a central representa-
tive assembly during this period of absolutism did not amount to a
general abatement of the representative system because the growth of
the representative government in France was not at the national level.
The most important representative functions were taken over by the
provincial estates which began to meet frequently and claimed that no
taxes should be levied without their consent. 44 As Charles Major
pointed out:
At the dawn of the seventeenth century, there had been estates in about
52.4 percent of France that had given consent to taxation and in about
8.2 percent more that had met regularly, employed a bureaucracy, voted
taxes for their own purposes, and prepared remonstrances to the king.
In about 12.6 percent of France the estates had occasionally met to deal
with taxes. Even in the remaining 26.8 percent, the estates had some-
times assembled to redact customs, ratify treaties, and elect deputies to
the Estates-General.
45
The concept of the Estates-General did not die after 1614 and, in fact,
the possibility of calling this body was considered even by Richelieu
and Mazarin.
46
Some of the functions of the Polish and English representative in-
stitutions were performed in France by the parlements, the most pow-
erful of which (the Parlement of Paris) attempted to intervene in the
political affairs of the kingdom. Parlement was not a representative
body like the Spanish Cortes or Swedish Riqstaq; nevertheless, it was
an institution limiting the king's despotic power. As J.H. Shennan
wrote, "[a]s the monarchy became more powerful, the Parlement be-
came the chief institutional opponent of royal arbitrariness and its atti-
tude provoked a number of conflicts, of which the Fronde of 1648-9 is
42. See J.R. MAJOR, supra note 40, at 15; see also J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC pt. 1, at 3-32 (1966).
43. See J.M. HAYDEN, supra note 39, at 5; see also J. CADART, LE REGIME ELECTORAL DES
ETATS GENERAUX DE 1789 ET SES ORIGINES (1952).
44. See J.R. MAJOR, supra note 40, at 160-61.
45. Id. at 663.
46. Id. at 623.
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perhaps the best known and the most violent. ' 47 During the four-
teenth century the Parlement of Paris, which was gradually estab-
lished as the highest court, also acquired the additional function of
registering royal edicts. The parliamentary process of registration,
which was to popularize and authenticate royal legislation, soon be-
came a significant restraint on the exercise of the king's power as the
Parlement declared its right to eliminate eventual contradictions be-
tween the new royal edicts and the existing legislature. 48 The royal
administration developed special procedures to overrule the remon-
strances. The king could issue a special letter (Lettre dejussion) order-
ing registration, or he could come to the court personally and force
Parlement to register the edict during a special lit de justice cere-
mony. 49 In fact, however, refusing registration gave undesired public-
ity to controversial royal edicts and frequent use of lit de justice
worked against the image of a "just" king who ruled in the interests of
his citizens. As its sense of political power grew, the Parlement of
Paris began to encroach upon the king's power. The efforts to impose
restraints on the king's absolutism were especially impressive during
Fronde when Parlement sought to place its own legislative authority
above that of the regent.50 Finally, although the Parlement of Paris
was unable to take over legislative functions from the royal adminis-
tration, through droit de remonstrances it began to play a political role
which had to be recognized even by the most powerful monarchs.5'
At the end of the seventeenth century, both the Parlement of Paris
and the provincial estates became more submissive. None of the es-
tates were officially closed down by the king's administration, but
under the pressure of the king's intendants, some became openly con-
trolled by the king's administration while others ceased to work. 2
The concept of representation did not vanish, however, especially
when given new inspiration in the political theory of representation
worked out by the French Enlightenment.
Hence, in conclusion, it must be admitted that French representa-
tive medieval institutions were established along with similar bodies in
Western Europe. In the fifteenth century, French representation was
less powerful than the Cortes in Spain and, in fact, less vigorous than
47. J. SHENNAN, THE PARLEMENT OF PARIS 4 (1968); see also A.L. MOOTE, THE REVOLT
OF THE JUDGES: THE PARLEMENT OF PARIS AND THE FRONDE 1643-1652 (1971).
48. See J. SHENNAN, supra note 47, at 159-60.
49. See K. KORANYI, POWSZECHNA HISTORIA PANSTWA I PRAWA [General History of the
State and Law] 134 (1966).
50. For a more extensive analysis of Fronde, see J. SHENNAN, supra note 47, at 289.
51. See A. LUBLINSKAYA, supra note 19, at 25-26.
52. See J.R. MAJOR, supra note 40, at 664.
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many estates in German principalities during the sixteenth century.
On the other hand, in Renaissance Germany, the powers of estates
were exceptionally strong and, in fact, even greater than those of the
English Parliament. 53 This power collapsed, however, with the en-
hancement of the Habsburg central government. Similarly in Spain, in
the second half of the sixteenth century, under the rule of Philip II
(1556-98), the power of the Cortes was also limited, and in the eight-
eenth century this once powerful institution became hardly more than
a rubber stamp.54 Also, during the late sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies the activity of the Italian parliaments abated, and by the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century, only the parliament of Sicily had any
real power. So, the restraints imposed upon the activity of French
representative bodies were not unusual during the age of absolutism.
As Professor Marongiu wrote:
There can be little doubt that from the mid-sixteenth century parlia-
ments were on the defensive. Outwardly they may still have appeared to
be important institutions, sometimes even formally acknowledged as
possessing constitutional authority. But apart from England, they were
no longer of prime importance in the history of their countries, and -
except for specific moments - no longer took the' initiative. It is enough
to look at Germany and the Empire, where the Landstande still enjoyed
extensive powers; their behaviour was conservative; there was no
development.".
It is therefore apparent that an examination of the constitutional
traditions in a country of classical absolutism is by no means a self-
contradictory concept. The fact is that representative institutions in
France fulfilled a significant historical function. Absolutism hampered
their growth along with that of of similar institutions in many Euro-
pean countries. But in their defense, the representative bodies were
able to impose considerable restraints on the king's arbitrary decisions
and to prevent the transformation of absolutism into despotism. In
fact, the French monarchy was conscious of these limitations even
during the classical period of absolutism of Louis XIV. As J.H. Shen-
nan stated,
Even Louis XIV was forced to discuss the application of his edicts with a
variety of bodies: clergy, towns, craftsmen's guilds, the nobility in certain
provinces, provincial estates, Parlements .... In fact, Louis was no less
53 See F.L. CARSTEN, PRINCES AND PARLIAMENTS IN GERMANY FROM THE FIFTEENTH
TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 442 (1959).
54. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the provincial estates in Spain were merged
with the Cortes of Castile. The Constitution of 1812 finally pronounced that the king would
legislate with the Cortes. See A. MARONGIU, MEDIEVAL PARLIAMENTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 61-76 (1968).
55. Id. at 235-36.
Fall 19891
Michigan Journal of International Law
aware than his predecessors had been of the restricted nature of royal
authority in France, of the need for the king to take council and then to
act in accordance with the dictates of justice and legality.
56
In pre-revolutionary France, the representative institutions were in de-
fense, but the concept of a constitutional government was gaining
prominence. The centuries of struggle with royal absolutism contrib-
uted to the maturity of constitutional consciousness, which in the be-
ginning of the constitutional era was one of the most important factors
in the creation of the constitution.
II. THE FRAMERS AND THEIR INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND
One who studies the origins of the constitutional movements and
who wishes to identify the framers of France's first constitution will
face a much more difficult task than his counterpart who studies
American or Polish constitutional traditions.
The American Constitution was adopted in the name of the people
and was intended to express their will. In fact, however, the formal
work was done by the fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, of which, on average, only about thirty attended the convention's
meetings. 57 In this group of founding fathers, a small group of promi-
nent members may be distinguished as the framers of the Constitution.
In Poland, political and social reforms were discussed widely, but
the constitutional drafts were prepared by several political leaders.
The final projects were subject to secret discussions within a small cir-
cle of the King's advisors. The Constitution was passed by the Seym
after reading and voting took place on the same day. The group that
made up the framers of the Polish Constitution was also easily
distinguishable.
The French Constitutional Assembly included 1196 deputies, and
the Constitution adopted on September 3, 1791 represented the result
of their arduous work over a period of more than two years. Among
the deputies, one may easily distinguish the more active and influential
figures such as Mirabeau, Lafayette, Robespierre, Sieyes, Camus,
Mounier or Talleyrand; the task of indicating more precisely the group
of drafters of the Constitution would have a slight chance of winning
more general agreement.
Pursuing his study, the student of the French constitutional his-
tory learns that it is much easier to identify the crucial ideas of
France's first written constitution than its intellectual origins. The
56. J. SHENNAN, supra note 47, at 283.
57. See C. SWISHER, supra note 9, at 30.
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Constitution of 1791 was preceded by extensive legislation and many
of its major provisions were already functioning. Although the Con-
stitution was not a mere compilation of the numerous decrees which
had been adopted during the first revolutionary period (1789-1791), it
comprised the main principles laid down by these pieces of legislation.
These principles had been worked out during the process of long con-
stitutional debates in the Assembly, clubs, street fights, press polemics
and intellectual clashes. Quite often, the origins of these principles are
not clear. Some of the ideas have been attributed to particular philos-
ophers, while others have been simply "in the air" in the sense that
they belonged to the intellectual creed of the revolutionary era rather
than to an identifiable school of political thinking.58 The historians of
the political ideas clashed quite often, attempting to back either the
"elitist" or the so-called "populist" concept of the intellectual origins
of the French Revolution. The proponents of the first approach stress
the role of the great writers in shaping the revolutionary climate of
ideas, while the others claim that the great philosophers expressed
what already had been in the minds of the people and developed
thoughts which were produced by the general intellectual ferment of
the Enlightenment.5
9
Ultimately, the student will often learn that, in fact, he is only at
the beginning of his study because the importance of intellectual fac-
tors can be properly understood only against the background of social
and economic conditions. From this perspective, both the ideas of the
Enlightenment and the revolutionary ferment at the end of the eight-
eenth century should be viewed as the product of the rise of the bour-
geoisie and its struggle against feudalism. 6° In addition, the student
will discover that even the selection of the bourgeoisie as a social
group whose hostility to the old regime caused the Revolution has not
always been accepted without reservation by historians who favor a
58. See J. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY 70 (1960).
59. See K. MARTIN, FRENCH LIBERAL THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 19
(1962).
60. The social and economic interpretation of the Revolution was particularly typical of his-
torians trained in the tradition of the Marxist historical methodology who claimed that the super-
structure (which included, among others, political and legal ideas, morality, religion, and social
habits) is determined by economic basis, and that major social transformations may be explained
through the theory of class conflicts. Among the representatives of this school is the widely
recognized George Lefebvre - a French Marxist and author of numerous works on the origins
of the French Revolution. The best known are: the early, concise, Quatre- Vingt-Neuf, published
originally in 1939 and in English translation (by Robert R. Palmer) in 1947, and La Rdvolution
Franqaise, published for the first time in 1930 in collaboration with Raymond Guyot and Philipe
Sagnac, and later in 1951 as Lefebvre's own, entirely rewritten edition which was translated and
published in English (by Elizabeth Moss Evanson) in 1962. The English edition is entitled The
French Revolution from Its Origins to 1793; see also G. LEFEBVRE, ETUDES SUR LA RtVOLU-
TION FRANqAISE (1954); J. GODEHOT, LES REVOLUTIONS 1770-1799, at 129 (1963).
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social interpretation of the revolutionary events in France. Those who
oppose the predominantly bourgeois character of the Revolution argue
that the peasants, not the bourgeoisie, were the main opponents of the
old regime and, in fact, the Revolution was the product of disap-
pointed bureaucrats: office holders, government servants, renters and
primarily, lawyers.
61
It is not the intention of the author to continue a description of the
difficulties usually faced by students regarding the origins of the
French Revolution. The point is, however, that the reader has to be
aware of the controversial character of any work dealing with intellec-
tual origins of this epoch. None of the trends presented above won a
consensus and the chances for such an agreement in the future are
slim. 6
2
The voluminous literature devoted to this topic imposes limitations
on any type of scrutiny, and forces authors to articulate their tasks
precisely. Obviously, the format and comparative character of this
study also determine its priorities. The author is primarily interested
in the factors that make the first constitutions comparable. To ex-
amine these factors, one has to answer the following questions: was
the timing and textural similarities incidental or due to the considera-
ble interflow of ideas between the countries which created the first
constitutions and was the intellectual background of the framers at
least comparable?
61. The main exponent of this trend is often recognized as Alfred Cobban, Professor of the
French History at the University of London. His critical opinion of the bourgeois character of
the Revolution was presented in his inaugural lecture in London in 1955, published as The Myth
of the Revolution, reprinted in A. COBBAN, ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1968); see
also A. COBBAN, THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1964).
The group of more moderate students of the revolutionary events try to promote a compro-
mising concept of the Revolution which they view as resulting from a combination of intellectual,
economic and social factors. Revolution was neither a sort of philosophical conspiracy nor a
pure result of class conflict. As William Doyle has concluded, "The principles of 1789, therefore,
cannot be identified with the aspirations of any one of the pre-revolutionary social groups." W.
DOYLE, ORIGINS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 210 (1988). Disputing the role of the intellec-
tual factors regarding the rise of the revolutionary spirit, the moderates followed the cautious
suggestions of Daniel Mornet, the author of an immense work on the intellectual origins of the
revolution. In the conclusions of his profound survey, Mornet suggested that the origins of the
Revolution can only be understood through a careful study of the interaction of political events
and ideas. In Mornet's opinion, the ideas developed and bloomed in the concrete revolutionary
circumstances which, on the other hand, were influenced by the climate of opinions. The great
philosophical doctrines contributed to this climate as much as the ideas in the air contributed to
the fame, development and influence of the great theories. See D. MORNET, LES ORIGINS IN-
TELLECTUELLES DE LA RftVOLUTION FRANqAISE 1715-1787, at 419-430 (1933); see also J.
MOUNIER, ON THE INFLUENCE ATTRIBUTED TO PHILOSOPHERS, FREE-MASONS, AND TO THE
ILLUMINATION ON THE REVOLUTION OF FRANCE 108 (1974).
62. See W. DOYLE, supra note 61, at 7-40; see also J. MCDONALD, ROUSSEAU AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 1762-1791, at 9-10 (1965).
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III. INTERFLOW OF IDEAS
The impact of European continental philosophers on the American
founding fathers raise many controversies. There are those who want
to view the American constitutional development as an unprecedented
and unique process: one which did not develop from any special his-
torical or intellectual background. But there are also those who claim
that the chief spokesmen of the American Revolution were consumers
rather than producers of ideas. 63 Representatives of the second group
usually admit that the American founding fathers drew most fruitfully
from antiquity and that despite the colonies' rebellion against their
mother country, they respected their British heritage and were dedi-
cated followers of British political thought. 64 Although Americans
stressed that the form of government of the new republic was not im-
ported from the British Constitution, they professed a reverence to the
British Constitution and, at least in the beginning of the struggle for
independence, they declared that they were defending their liberties
and rights under the British law which was viewed as "perfect in
human institutions. ' 65  However, American political thinkers,
although extracting heavily from British political thought and British
constitutional experience, were very selective in whose ideas they fol-
lowed.66 Next to John Locke, who was recognized as the theoretical
father of the American Revolution, the American political philoso-
phers most often cited Edward Cooke, Henry Bolinbroke, William
Blackstone, James Harrington, David Hume and Algernon Sidney.
67
63. P.M. Spurlin quotes William Gladstone's famous remark in his essay on de.Tocqueville's
De Ddmocratie en Amdrique that the American Constitution was "the most wonderful work ever
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man," and John Stuart Mill's declaration
that "the whole edifice was constructed within the memory of man, upon abstract principles."
P.M. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801, at 27 (1940). In his observation in DE
LA DIMOCRATIE EN AMIRIQUE (published in 1835-1840) Alexis de Tocqueville remarked that
the American Constitution was based "upon a wholly novel theory which may be considered a
great discovery in modern political science," quoted in H. TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 21 (1911), C. ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 65 (1963).
64. See Kirk, supra note 2, at 5; see also C. ROSSITER, supra note 63, at 10. Harris Taylor
observed that the Americans established an "ancient type of a federal league." H. TAYLOR, supra
note 63, at 10.
65. D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 356 (1951) (quoting Thomas Jeffer-
son). For opinions on the British roots of the American constitutional ideas, see id.; for the claim
of anglophilism of John Adams see R.R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLU-
TION: THE CHALLENGE 275 (1959); H. TAYLOR, supra note 63, at 19. It was often claimed that
the publication of Tom Paine's Common Sense in January 1776 and his criticism of the British
Constitution contributed to the exposition of the individual attributes of the American system. J.
MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 467-493 (1943).
66. C. RosSITER, supra note 63, at 65.
67. See id. at 68-69. On the impact of Locke's ideas, see G. DIETZE; THE FEDERALIST: A
CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 324-31 (1960). The.careful reader of the
Federalist will discover that the other great political thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Ben-
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The impact of European continental philosophers was not so
widely acknowledged. Americans split very frequently among their
opinions in regard to the influence of French thought on the founding
fathers. As James Breck Perkins wrote,
By French literature the colonists were unaffected, because, with few ex-
ceptions, they knew nothing about it. The number who could read
French was small, the number who did read French to any extent was
smaller .... [T]he political theories of Montesquieu and of Rousseau,
the wit of Voltaire, the infidelity of the encyclopedists, had no influence
upon men, the most of whom did not know these writers even by name.
Our ancestors' modes of thought were essentially English; the political
traditions which they inherited, and the political institutions which they
founded, were unaffected by French thought.
68
Between this extreme statement and the opinions of those who be-
lieved that Americans had "taken all their knowledge" from continen-
tal European thought, one can easily find a variety of more moderate
positions. 69 For example, even the most militant defenders of the
"unique character" of American political thought rarely contested the
impact of Montesquieu on the framers of the Constitution of 1787.70
The first English translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit of Laws was
announced for sale in Boston in 1762, and his Persian Letters were
offered to American readers two years later. 7' The authors of The
Federalist frequently mentioned Montesquieu directly but not always
favorably. Madison, in his tenth, fourteenth and thirty-ninth letters,
argued that Montesquieu failed to distinguish a republic from a de-
mocracy. Hamilton, in letter nine, maintained that the size of the re-
tham, Robert Filmer and Edmund Burke were almost never directly cited. See C. ROSSITER,
supra note 63, at 67; G. DIETZE, supra, at 319. On the impact of Edmund Burke, see KIRK,
supra note 2.
68. J. PERKINS, FRANCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 418-419 (1911). On the influence
of Montesquieu and Rousseau, see P. SPURLIN, ROUSSEAU IN AMERICA 1760-1809 (1969); P.
SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801 (1940). Howard Mumford Jones, the author
of AMERICA AND FRENCH CULTURE, 1750-1848 (1927) was of a different opinion. He wrote,
That the great mass of the American people ever learned enough French to read or speak it
does not appear. But, among the cultivated classes from the earliest times there were those
who were familiar with the language; and it is from these leaders that ideas and attitudes
descended to the rank and file in the United States.
Id. at 215. Jones observed that the popularity of French reached its height in the years 1770 to
1797. Id.
69. See Laboulaye, Etude sur L 'Esprit des Loix de Montesquieu, I REVUE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 161, 179 (1869).
70. Francis Newton Thorpe maintained that Montesquieu's THE SPIRIT OF LAWS had more
influence on eighteenth-century American political thought than any other work on government.
See F. THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 155 (1901); see also
C. ROSSITER, supra note 63, at 71 ("Every literate colonist could quote [Montesquieul to
advantage").
71. C. MONTESQUIEU, I & 2 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1746) (first English edition translated
by T. Nugent, 1750) (first U.S. edition translated by I. Thomas, Jr., 1802). C. MONTESQUIEU,
PERSIAN LETTERS (1721).
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public which the author of The Spirit of Laws had in mind would not
be applicable to any of the larger states in the American confedera-
tion.72 Still, the authors of The Federalist praised Montesquieu for his
examination and popularization of the English system of government.
As Madison wrote, "The oracle, who is always consulted and cited on
this subject, is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of
this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at
least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the atten-
tion of mankind.
' '73
It must be acknowledged that admiration of the French Enlighten-
ment in America was balanced by criticism of, if not an aversion to the
French model of the pre-revolutionary government. 74 A distaste for
French monarchy contributed to the fact that in the great debates over
the federal Constitution, France is scarcely mentioned. 75 Generally
speaking, Americans were convinced that their government was the
best that ever did exist and were interested in the French affairs pri-
marily because they believed that through the French Revolution their
experience could be spread throughout the globe.
76
The American struggle for independence occurred at the most op-
portune time, when France's traditional desire to curb British power
coincided with the intention to compensate for the losses suffered in
the Seven Years War. The American Revolution was also proof that
liberal ideas of the Enlightenment had spread all over the world. As
James B. Perkins wrote, "to those who pointed out abuses of the old
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 126 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961); see also THE FED-
ERALIST No. 10, at 135-36 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 150
(J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 280-286 (J. Madison) (B. Wright
ed. 1961).
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 337 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). The French philos-
opher was also widely cited by the critics of the Constitution. See Clinton, The Letters of "Cato,"
in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 247-78 (P. Ford ed. 1892) (seven
letters published in the NEW YORK JOURNAL between September 27, 1987 and January 3, 1788).
74. For comments on Jefferson's first observations on the government of France, see C. HA-
ZEN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN OPINION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 6-7 (1964). Jeffer-
son was convinced that politically France was backward. He wrote, "I presume there are not to
be found five men in Europe who understand the nature of liberty and the theory of government
so well as they are understood by five hundred men in America." Id. at 37. In his letter to John
Melish of January 13, 1813 he wrote, "[The republican party members] esteem the people of
England and France equally, and equally detest the governing powers of both." A. MASON,
FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING 384 (3d ed. 1977).
75. Ketchem, France and American Politics 1763-1793, 78 POL. SCI. Q. 198, 217 (1963).
76. C. Hazen observed that the French Revolution became a more frequent topic to be dis-
cussed in state rather than federal papers. C. HAZEN, supra note 74, at 246; see also R. MORRIS,
THE EMERGING NATIONS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 17 (1970). For Jefferson's opin-
ion that the American model of government is "without comparison the best existing or that ever
did exist," see D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 160 (1951); see also Letter of
Richard Price to Thomas Jefferson (May 4, 1789), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 90-91 (J. Boyd ed. 1958) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS].
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regime, the Revolution in America seemed to be [the] best proof that
those regimes had to die."
'77
American interests were well-represented in France by Benjamin
Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas Deane. Franklin's arrival in France in
December 1776 was an important event. Since 1772, he had been a
member of the French Academy and was preceded by the reputation
of philosopher and scientist. He spoke French correctly and his con-
nections with French philosophers were widely known. 78 To quote
Henry S. Commager:
It was France that welcomed the American example - welcomed it,
followed it, and even improved upon it. It was in France that the
"American party" triumphed, briefly, to be sure; the party made up
somewhat loosely of LaFayette, la Rochefoucauld, Brissot, Condorcet,
Beaumarchais, Du Pont de Nemours, Helvetius, the Abbes Sieyes,
Raynal, and Mably, and miscellany of others-followers of Turgot and
converts to his doctrines of Physiocracy and of Progress, members of the
Amis des Noirs, of the Club Americans, or the Masonic Lodge of the
Nine Sisters. Franklin was the pivotal point, Franklin who was a legend,
but a very active one, and who saw to it that the American Constitution
and other State Papers, were translated and published in France.
79
Franklin was very successful in representing the American case.
Supported by Pierre A.C. Beaumarchais' efforts, he produced signifi-
cant financial assistance for the rebellious colonists and successfully
conducted negotiations which were concluded with the French alli-
ance and signed with the United States in early 1778. His presence in
France encouraged a great number of Europeans (such as marquis La
Fayette, Baron Kalb and a Pole, Pulaski) to offer their services to the
77. J. PERKINS, supra note 68, at 209.
78. Id. at 129. For an examination of intellectual factors regarding the rise of revolutionary
spirit in France, see D. MORNET, LES ORIGINS INTELLECTUELLES DE LA RtVOLUTION FRAN-
qAISE 1715-1787 (1933); W. DOYLE, supra note 61. For an examination of the contribution of
social groups to the emergence of the revolutionary movement, see A. COBBAN, THE MYTH OF
THE REVOLUTION (1955), as well as his THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION (1964) and ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1968). For a social and eco-
nomic interpretation of the Revolution, see the following works of G. Lefebvre: QUARTRE-
VINGT-NEUF (1939) (English translation by R.R. Palmer 1947); ETUDES SUR LA R.VOLUTION
FRANgAISE (1954); LA RtVOLUTION FRAN AIS (1930) (with R. Guyot and P. Sagnac) (Le-
febvre's chapters are translated into English in E. EVANSON, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: FROM
ITS ORIGINS TO 1793 (1962)).
79. H. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON: How EUROPE IMAGINED AND AMERICA
REALIZED THE ENLIGHTENMENT 224 (1977), quoted in A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 10. The
new legislative texts from America were carefully distributed by Franklin and Jefferson in Paris,
and John Adams in London at The Hague. For further detail, see J. GODECHOT, FRANCE AND
THE ATLANTIC REVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1770-1799, at 45 (1965). Some
of these texts were published in Les Affaires de L'Angleterre et de l'Amerique, the periodical
published both in Antwerp and Paris. In 1790, French lawyer Jacques Vincent de ]a Croix
offered a course on the Constitution of the United States at the 'lucee de Paris.' The material
from the course was published by the popular Paris newspaper Le Moniteur. See A. BLAUSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 16.
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new Republic.80 The French emotional and financial involvement in
the American War was so significant that some of the pamphleteers
claimed that it was the American Revolution, its cost and the opinions
created by its supporters, which forced the King to call the Estates
General.
8 '
Life in America was romanticized and idealized in a number of
books and pamphlets such as Lettres d'un Cultivateur American (1784)
which depicted the charms of a wild but happy and dignified life in the
big country, not contaminated by civilization. 82 The increasing popu-
larity of the American style of life and ideas of the American republic
also had critics, led by Jacques Mallet du Pan, editor of the Mercure
de France, who strongly attacked French involvement abroad.
83
IV. AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE FRENCH DECLARATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN
In the year before the breakdown of the old Regime, friends of the
American cause frequently gathered either in LaFayette's hotel in
Paris or in the house occupied by Jefferson, who in 1784 was sent to
assist Franklin, and in 1785 replaced Franklin as a minister to France.
Jefferson remained in France until 1789.84
The French fascination with America reached its highest peak in
the several months preceding the adoption of the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizen. During this period, the political
work of the American Revolution was most extensively discussed.
Before 1789, four editions of the Constitution of the United States had
been published. The American state constitutions also inspired a
broad interest. The French were most attracted to the constitution of
Pennsylvania, which provided for a unicameral legislative system and
an executive power entrusted to a president, chosen by the legislature
and assisted by a council of twelve. The Pennsylvania Constitution
was praised in France as the most democratic constitution adopted
80. For comments on Franklin's stay in France, see C. HAZEN, supra note 74, at 1. On
Franklin's meeting with Voltaire, see R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 44-45. R. Palmer wrote:
"Franklin, Jefferson, and Adams, along with men like Lafayette and Kosciusko, were only the
most eminent among thousands who served, in their own persons, as channels of communication
between America and Europe." R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 252.
81. LE COMPTE DE VERGENNES, CAUSE DES ESTATES GENEROUX (1788) cited in B. FAY,
THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT IN FRANCE AND AMERICA 253 (1927).
82. The author was most probably Hector Saint-Jean de Creveceur. B. FAY, supra note 81,
at 232-33; see also R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 257-259.
83. J. DU PAN, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (intro. by
P. Beik 1974).
84. The most frequent visitors at Jefferson's house were Mounier, Lally, Rabaut, Duport,
Lameth and Barnave. B. FAY, supra note 81, at 256.
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anywhere. 85 As Albert P. Blaustein argues, "France's first constitu-
tion ... looked more to Pennsylvania than to any other United States
source for its governmental structure. '8 6 In regard to other American
state constitutions, those of Virginia, Massachusetts and Maryland
were most widely discussed. It was often raised that the preambles of
these constitutions, as well as their prototype - The American Decla-
ration of Independence - strongly influenced the authors of the
French Declaration. As Bernard Fay wrote, "A detailed comparison
of the French Declaration of Rights with the preambles of these three
constitutions brings out a striking resemblance. ' 87 This thesis is ques-
tioned by French historians who, like Godechot, argue that, "[t]he
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen offers some sig-
nificant differences from the American Declarations. '8 8 Godechot
maintains that the American and French Declarations vary in charac-
ter. The American texts were to be "very specific, very American,"
while the French Declaration was conceived as a sort of universal
manifesto appealing to mankind as a whole. 89 In Mirabeau's words,
the French Declaration was to be "applicable to all ages, all peoples,
all moral and geographic latitudes." 90
85. J. GODECHOT, supra note 60, at 35.
86. A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 8; H. COMMAGER, supra note 79, at 224. The idea of a
unicameral legislative body was advocated for France by Franklin and Turgot. See H.M. JONES,
supra note 68, at 528. Gouverneur Morris was of a different opinion. He spoke against the
seizure of all political power from the French King and about "the anarchy which would result
from giving the wretched constitution of the Pennsylvania legislature to the Kingdom of
France." I DIARY AND LETTERS OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 38 (A. Morris ed. 1888). Although
Morris found that "the American example had powerfully affected the attitude of French
thought toward liberty, equality and constitutional popular government," he feared that the
French, "lacking experience and poise, would seek to apply these new and seductive ideas in an
arbitrary way with dangerous disregard of changed conditions." C. HAZEN, supra note 74, at 82.
The idea of a unicameral legislature, modeled on the Pennsylvania constitution was also criti-
cized by John Adams. See H.M. JONES, supra note 68, at 528.
87. B. FAY, supra note 81, at 266. Blaustein, supporting this opinion, wrote, "[t]hus, while
the famous French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 1789, was offi-
cially the work of LaFayette, Mirabeau, and Jean Joseph Mounier, it also had claim to American
parentage." A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 16.
88. J. GODECHOT, supra note 60, at 96.
89. Id.
90. Id. Careful examination of the debates of the French Constitution Assembly confirms
that the deputies believed that they framed a manifesto that was more than a transcription of the
ideas of the great philosophers and, in fact, had universal significance. The Declaration of Rights
was to proclaim the commonly recognized immortal principles of the new age. For debates on
the Declaration, see 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES DE 1787 A 1860, at 221 (J. Macidal, E.
Laurent, eds. 1870). A demand for a universal declaration of rights was also confirmed in many
of the cahiers, which were widely recognized as guides indicating the sphere of a national consen-
sus. Cahiers de doleances were lists of grievances drafted during the elections to the Estates
General by the electoral assemblies of the French provinces, separately by each estate. The ca-
hiers, although not treated by the Constitutional Assembly as imperative instructions for depu-
ties, had informational and psychological influence. The cahiers were studied carefully by the
Committee on the Constitution, and an official Summary of the Cahiers was presented in the
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The dispute concerning the origins of the French Declaration re-
sulted in the polarization of the positions taken by the disputants, who
usually either attempted to trivialize or overestimate the reception of
the American patterns.91 In fact, the arguments of both disputing par-
ties are not fully convincing and the truth about the origins of the
Declaration lays somewhere in-between. It is unquestionable that
there was a constant interflow of ideas between the two countries and
that the French were attracted to the American political arrange-
ments. The idea of a bill of rights - which could be used as a pream-
ble to a constitution - was American, and in fact Americans
translated it into the idea of a constitution as a single document pro-
viding a basic law superior to any legislative act and different from
mere statutes. Also, the idea that a constitution should be passed or
amended by special conventions or with requirements higher than
those expected for ordinary statutes was worked out in America.
92
The original draft of the Declaration was prepared by LaFayette
and reviewed by Jefferson who sent a copy to Madison for comment.
93
The draft was also studied by Governor Morris who was in Paris occa-
sionally on private business.94 Before preparing his draft, Lafayette
also discussed the subject with Hamilton, Franklin and Paine. How-
ever, the first Lafayette draft did not meet with an enthusiastic recep-
tion. The draft generated heated disputes during which some deputies
Assembly on July 27, 1789 by the Clermont-Tonnere, Deputy of North Paris. The Summary,
which in fact presented an incomplete list of claims and dealt predominantly with constitutional
issues, did not mention the declaration. The demand for a declaration was, however, so widely
recognized that the Assembly began to work on a list of basic rights on August 4. B. HYSLOP, A
GUIDE TO THE GENERAL CAHIERS OF 1789, at 104 (1936). For an official summary of the
cahiers, see I SELECTED DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: THE
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 103-04 (L. Leg ed. 1905); see also J. GODECHOT, supra note 60, at 95.
91. Overestimating the resemblance of the American and French documents, Richard Mor-
ris writes, "The Virginia statesman George Mason might well have instituted an action of plagia-
rism against the authors of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen which the
French National Assembly adopted on August 26, 1789. The resemblance to Mason's Bill of
Rights which the Virginia Assembly had enacted back in June of 1776 is too close to be coinci-
dental." R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 56.
92. See C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT, at 14-16,
87 (1925).
93. See A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 16. In January, 1789, Jefferson had written Madison
that he had contributed to the framing of a declaration of rights and had sent two drafts, includ-
ing one by Lafayette. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 64 (P. Ford ed. 1895). Jefferson
also had a copy of a draft submitted by Dr. Richard Gem, a successful English physician and
ardent devotee of republican principles. See Proposition Submitted by Richard Gem and Jeffer-
son's letters to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789) and to Richard Gem (Sept. 9, 1789) in JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 76, at 384-99. In July, before presenting a declaration to the Assembly,
Lafayette sent another draft to Jefferson. D. MALONE, supra note 76, at 223. Lafayette's draft of
a Declaration of Rights is published in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 76, at 230-33.
94. Morris arrived in France in February, 1789, and remained in Europe for nine years. He
was appointed U.S. Minister to France in 1792.
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even proposed not to publish the Declaration until the adoption of the
Constitution. 95 Finally, the Assembly accepted a draft that was a
compromise between Lafayette's initial project and drafts of other
deputies such as Sieyes, Mirabeau and Mounier, which were most
widely discussed and influential. The compromise brought more
French tincture to the Declaration. 96 The literal comparison of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen with the American Dec-
laration of Independence and the Virginia Bill of Rights brings us to
conclusions that urge modification of several popular opinions.
It has often been advanced that the Declaration of the Rights of
Man more markedly attached equality to liberty and stressed the im-
portance of this conjunction more than the American Declaration of
Independence or Virginia Bill of Rights. In Professor Lefebvre's
words, "[b]y bringing the resounding collapse of privileges and feudal-
ism, the popular revolution highlighted equality as the Anglo-Saxons
had not done."
'97
Article 1 of the French Declaration proclaims that "men are born
free and equal in rights."98 Equality is also referred to in several fol-
lowing articles.99 The Declaration guarantees equal rights in courts,
equal access to governmental positions, and fiscal equality. Even with
all these equalitarian provisions, however, one has to admit that equal-
ity, although emphasized more firmly than in the Anglo-Saxon doc-
trine, "holds a lesser place than freedom in the [French]
95. Lafayette's draft was more general than the final text of the Declaration. The draft de-
clared that men are made free and equal by nature. The draft enumerated natural and inaliena-
ble rights of man: rights to speak, write, freely communicate ideas, and religious freedom. It
stated that natural rights are confirmed by society and that the source of sovereignty resides in
the nation. The draft, however, focused on the concept of representative government and the
separation of powers, as well as on problems that were only generally mentioned in the final text
of the Declaration, but were in fact addressed by the Decree of October 1, 1789, and the Consti-
tution of 1791. On the other hand, the text of the Declaration went further in explaining the
ideas of equal freedom, presumption of innocence, personal and property inviolability, due pun-
ishment, and maintenance of public force. In neither the draft nor the final text of the Declara-
tion was there room for the concept of trial by jury, which was strongly advocated by Thomas
Jefferson. JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 76, at 232-33.
96. See G. LEFEBVRE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION FROM ITS ORIGINS TO 1793, at 146
(1962). The most exhaustive comparison of the French Declaration and the Virginia Bill of
Rights was presented by R.R. Palmer in Appendix IV to THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLU-
TIONS, supra note 65, at 518-21. The comparison brings Palmer to the conclusion that "there
was in fact a remarkable parallelism" between both acts. Id. at 487.
97. 0. LEFEBVRE, supra note 96, at 146.
98. The American Declaration of Independence states that "all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights." The Virginia Bill of Rights
of 1776 declares, "That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights." 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3813 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909)
[hereinafter VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS].
99. Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, reprinted in J. ROBERTS, I FRENCH
REVOLUTION DOCUMENTS 171-73 (1966) [hereinafter French Declaration].
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Declaration. "0
Liberty is by far the most important right among the fundamental
principles of 1789-1791. Men are declaied free from arbitrary perse-
cution and free to communicate their opinions, provided they respect
the same liberty of others. Liberty, property, security, and resistance
to oppression are recognized as fundamental individual rights stem-
ming from the nature of human beings. 01 Equality does not figure
among these sacred and imprescriptible rights. The French Assembly
focused on the condemnation of the unequal position of estates and
privileges of minorities, and following Sieyes' argument, decided not to
include social equality among the rights protected by the Declaration.
Contrary to the second French Constitution of 1793, which stressed
the significance of social equality, the majority of the Constitutional
Assembly in 1788-1791 was satisfied with the protection of equal free-
dom, which was defined as the right to do what does not harm an-
other. The right of "equal freedom" was formulated more clearly in
the Constitution of 1791 than in the Virginia Bill of Rights. On the
other hand, the Virginia Declaration places greater emphasis on free-
dom and frequency of elections and on jury trial, and was more con-
crete in its warnings against excessive bail and more explicit in its
reference to general warrants, suspending of laws and standing
armies. 
0 2
In further assessing the American and French Declarations, it has
often been raised that a number of deputies of the French Assembly,
led by Robespierre, were dissatisfied with the insufficient treatment of
religious liberty and religious toleration in the French Declaration.
100. J. GODECHOT, supra note 60, at 96. On one hand, the idea of equality appealed to an
American sense of justice; on the other hand, they feared that in practice it would collide with
individual freedom. Generally, they were satisfied With equality before the law and felt uncom-
fortable with the French attempts to extend equality to social and economic relations. "By the
law of nature," wrote John Adams,
all men are men and not angels - men and not lions - men and not whales - men and not
eagles - that is, they are all of the same species. And this is the most that the equality of
nature amounts to. But man differs by nature from man almost as much as man from beast.
The equality of nature is moral and political only and means that all men are independent.
Quoted in C. HAZEN, supra note 74, at 274-75. On the limits of American dedication to the
creation of an egalitarian society, see R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 21-22.
101. In 1789, the French Assembly generally showed a greater sensitivity to egalitarian val-
ues than did the framers of the American Declaration. Still, it took several years to turn this
sensitivity into a fully expressed egalitarian program. Attacks on private property from such
socialists as Mably or Morelly, or Rousseau's well known criticism of law as an instrument of
exploitation and his accusation of excessive accumulation and unequal distribution of property
did not find an endorsement in 1789. The Assembly recognized property as sacred (art. 17) and
established a representative system based on a property qualification. For more exhaustive com-
ments, see K. MARTIN, FRENCH LIBERAL THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 220-58
(2d ed. 1954).
102. See R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 518-20.
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The American Declaration of Independence refers to the Creator
because Americans were generally known for their attachment to reli-
gion. On the other hand, they were dedicated to religious freedom and
determined not to grant priority to any religion. The writers who are
inclined to expose the different characters of the American and the
French Declarations argue that, contrary to the American revolution-
ary acts, the French Declaration of Rights does not pay sufficient at-
tention to religious liberty and, by placing itself under the auspices of
the Supreme Being, the Declaration was intended to preserve the pri-
macy of Catholicism. 103 The Assembly's satisfaction with the mild
reference to religious toleration has been recognized as a failure of the
Voltairians during this phase of the Revolution.
These arguments can be accepted only with some reservations.
First of all, although religious matters are not discussed in the Decla-
ration of Independence, they are recognized in the states' bills of
rights. The Virginia declaration recognizes "the duty which we owe to
our Creator." Generally, the Virginia Bill of Rights is more explicit
than the French Declaration in reference to Christian and moral vir-
tues.' °4 Secondly, in revolutionary France the diffusion of Voltaire's
works was enormous and his influence can hardly be overestimated. 0 5
Soon after the adoption of the Declaration, the French Assembly
promulgated a series of acts relating to ecclesiastical reorganization.
Recognizing the significance of the principle of religious liberty and
equality, the Assembly granted religious liberty to Protestants. The
Decree of December 2, 1789 called for the confiscation of Church
property. In addition, the most important Civil Constitution of the
Clergy, adopted on July 12, 1790, drastically limited the independence
of the French Catholic Church from the Pope and tied the clergy
through prescribed oaths, salaries and newly-established ecclesiastical
districts of the state. '0 6 These acts, passed by the Assembly, appear to
confirm the influence of Voltairian secular rationalism on the minds of
the people during the preconstitutional phase of the French Revolu-
tion. France remained a predominantly Catholic country. This fact
alone prevented the servile adoption of the American models. On the
other hand, it must be conceded that, with the development of the
French Revolution, Americans were more concerned with "the air of
103. For more details on the disputes in the Assembly, see ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES DE
1787 A 1860, supra note 90, at 221. For the Decree on the Fundamental Principles of Govern-
ment, see J. STEWART, DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 115-17 (1951).
104. See R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 520.
105. Between 1778 and 1935, thirty-four complete editions of his works and numerous in-
complete ones were published.
106. J. STEWART, supra note 103, at 167-89.
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atheism" and French hostility to religion than with the insufficient
protection of Protestants. Commenting on this trend, John Adams
admitted that the French drew more from their own philosophy than
from American experience. In a letter to Dr. Price he concluded, "I
own to you I know not what to make of a republic of thirty million
atheists .... "o107
As is often suggested, the populist character of the French Decla-
ration of Rights is more apparent than real. The American Declara-
tion of Independence states that governments derive "their just powers
from the consent of the governed." The French text is more explicitly
Rousseauistic by proclaiming that "law is the expression of the general
will."' 8 In fact, however, both Declarations are Rousseauistic only in
these phrases. As manifestos of developing liberalism, they proclaim a
victory for individualistic philosophy which recognizes an individual,
man, or citizen to be a subject of fundamental rights. Individual au-
tonomy was proclaimed as being worthy of constitutional protection;
an individual was declared the best judge of his own well-being, and
the interests of the community were recognized as the sum of individ-
ual interests.' 0 9
The framers of both Declarations followed Rousseau's concept of
the general will only by name. The American Declaration of Indepen-
dence focuses on the reasons for which the 13 original States of the
Union severed their colonial allegiance. The interpretation of the
principle of the popular origin of power is left to constitutional regula-
tion which fully recognizes a representative form of government. The
French Declaration, which was itself conceived as a preface to the
Constitution, more explicitly explains the idea of representation. For
most of the deputies, sovereignty was indivisible and inalienable, but
the sovereign people could exercise their power through elected repre-
sentatives. Article 6 of the Declaration reads:
Law is the expression of the general will; all citizens have the right to
concur personally, or through their representatives, in its formulation; it
107. C. HAZEN, supra note 74, at 153. In fact, French religious instability was highly influ-
ential on American attitudes. The fluctuations from religious infidelity to the orthodoxy of the
Jesuits and ultramontanism of J. D. Maistre scared Americans. "France, instead of being a
country to admire and pattern after, was now a nation to pity and dispise." H.M. JONES, supra
note 68, at 447-48.
108. French Declaration, supra note 99, art. 6.
109. The concept of "general will" (la volont6 generale) was basically anti-individualistic. It
was discussed by Montesquieu, Holbach, Diderot, and other philosophers, but Rousseau was
recognized as its main proponent. For Rousseau, the general will was indivisible, and inaliena-
ble. It embodied the interests of society as a whole. For Rousseau's influence on the French
Revolution, see J. MCDONALD, ROUSSEAU AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1762-1791 (1965);
J. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1960); A. MEYNIER, JEAN-JAC-
QUES ROUSSEAU: REVOLUTIONNAIRE (1911).
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must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens,
being equal before it, are equally admissible to all public offices, posi-
tions, and employments, according to their capacity and without other
distinction than that of virtues and talents. 0
Sieyes' opinion that deputies were representatives rather than sim-
ply "intermediaries" prevailed in the Assembly. He stressed that the
majority of them had the right to decide, and that the will of the ma-
jority meant the sum of the individual wills of its members. It was
Sieyes who, in his popular pamphlet Qu'est-ce le Tiers Etat, argued
that "individual wills are the sole elements of the general will" and
that, "it is useless to talk reason if, for a single instant, this first princi-
ple, that the general will is the opinion of the majority, and not of the
minority, is abandoned.""'
Summarizing, one has to admit that the resemblance between the
French and American Declarations is remarkable. Both acts recog-
nize that the organization of a society should be based on principles of
liberty, individual autonomy, representative government, and power of
majority combined with the rights of minority. With all these similari-
ties, however, both Declarations differ in the emphasis given to partic-
ular rights. A literal comparison of the texts does not deprive the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of its very special
French character.
V. THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND
CITIZEN AND THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
The American Federal Convention adopted the Constitutioi with-
out a bill of rights prefixed to it. The Convention thereby departed
from the format that had previously existed in some states. The mo-
tion of George Mason and Elbridge Gerry to preface the Constitution
with a bill of rights was opposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut on
the grounds that "[t]he State Declarations of Rights are not repealed
by this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient."" 2 The argu-
ment that Congress should be trusted in its intention to preserve the
rights of the people was convincing to the delegates of the Convention
who unanimously (voting as state units) opposed the motion to form a
bill of rights committee. " I3
The struggle for the ratification of the Constitution promptly
proved that the Federal Convention erred in its evaluation of public
110. French Declaration, supra note 99 (emphasis added).
11. Translation and reprint in J. STEWART, supra note 103, at .50.
112. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 116 (1955).
113. Id.
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expectations. The demand for a bill of rights was widespread. The
requirement of a bill of rights became a main point in the Antifederal-
ists' attack on the Constitution.1 14  Jefferson, in his letters from
France, argued strongly that the lack of a bill might result in the "elec-
tive despotism" of Congress. Madison was generally in favor of a bill,
although he did not believe the omission to be a major defect of the
Constitution." 5 The Constitution was ratified only with the general
understanding that "the amendments proposed will soon become a
part of the system."
'"16
On May 4, 1789, Madison notified Congress that he intended to
introduce the subject of amendments to the Constitution.' 17 Madison
made his statement a day before the French Estates General met for
the opening plenary session in the great Salle des Menus Plaisirs. In
fact, the record shows that the drafting of the French Declaration and
the American Bill took place almost simultaneously. Madison submit-
ted his draft on June 8 and Lafayette presented his proposal to the
French Assembly on July 11.118 On August 13, the House in America
resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole and discussed the report
of the Committee of Eleven to which the subject of the amendments
had been referred. A special Committee of Three (Benson, Sherman
and Sedgwick) submitted the Report with the Third Draft of the
Amendments on August 24-25, two days before the French Assembly
adopted the Declaration of the Rights on August 27, i789.)i 9 The
Amendments passed Congress on September 25, 1789.
The American Bill of Rights was ratified on December 15, 1791
but the drafting process was completed before the adoption of the
French Declaration. The record shows clearly that the draftsmen of
the American Bill could not be influenced directly by the final text of
the French Declaration. They could be, however, familiar with its
early drafts and inspired by the French constitutional debates. A thor-
114. See Smith, An Address to the People of the State of New York of 1788, in PAMPHLETS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEO-
PLE 1787-1788, at 114 (P. Ford ed. 1988). Antifederalist Whitehill argued in the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention of 1787 that "he anticipate[d] annihilation of the state governments which
would destroy civil liberties." A. MASON, supra note 74, at 267-73. For arguments of Antifeder-
alist Lenoir in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, see id. at 275-77.
115. A. MASON, supra note 74, at 318-22 (letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Dec. 20, 1898) and letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788)); see also C.
WARREN, supra note 92, at 80-81.
116. A. MASON, supra note 74, at 310 (Samuel Adams at Massachusetts Convention).
117. 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 247
(J. Gales ed. 1834) [hereinafter 1 ANNALS].
118. Id. at 424-49; JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 76; at 230-31.
119. 1 ANNALS, supra note 117, at 72, 88, 778, 779, 913; 2 F. THORPE, supra note 70, at 257-
59; J. STEWART, supra note 103, at 112-15.
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ough examination of the record does not confirm this thesis. It is true
that the American public was enthusiastic about the French Revolu-
tion and the founding fathers were well-informed of the European
events. The works on the French Declaration were hailed in America
as evidence that Europe had followed the American model. There is,
however, no evidence that Americans were ready to draw from the
French constitutional thought. In fact, even the idea that France gave
America philosophy and America offered the benefit of its experience
to France was not popular among American draftsmen, who preferred
to believe that their constitutional concept grew out of British seeds. 12
0
As F.N. Thorpe wrote, "[t]urning to their sources, the first ten
[amendments] are clearly, as Jefferson declared they ought to be, a
Declaration of Rights, and each may be said to have emanated from a
common source, the State constitutions, or the 'ancient and undoubted
rights' of Englishmen." 
12
1
Discussing the historical background of his draft of the Bill of
Rights, Madison returned to precedents of the American Declaration
of Independence, state Constitutions and state Bills of Rights and Rat-
ifying Conventions; to the British constitutional documents; and to the
Magna Carta of 1215, Petition of Rights of 1628 and Bill of Rights of
1689.122 Madison admitted that the concept of a bill of rights
originated from attempts to limit the power of the British Crown. He
claimed, however, that Americans had to work out a more advanced
Bill because the British constitution did not secure freedom of press
and liberty of conscience 12 3 - rights highly esteemed in America.
120. Hazen claims that some Americans, like Jefferson, believed that "America might well be
the teacher of her elder sister [France] in some respects, and these men thought that she might
equally well be her pupil in others." C. HAZEN, supra note 74, at 143. It seems that, with the
progress of the French Revolution, belief in the possibility of learning from France was clearly
fading in America.
121. 2 F. THORPE, supra note 70, at 330.
122. 1 ANNALS, supra note 117, at 431-42. H. Taylor wrote, "If anything is certain in the
history of any country it is that the essence of the English constitutional system as reformed by
the Revolutions of 1640 and 1688 and as defined by Blackstone in 1758, passed into our first state
constitutions, whose bill of rights set forth, for the same time, in a written and dogmatic form,
the entire scheme of civil liberty as it existed in England in 1776." H. TAYLOR, supra note 63, at
361.
123. 1 ANNALS, supra note 117, at 436. The British Bill of Rights of 1689 did not proclaim
the freedom of speech. It provided only that "the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings
in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court . . . ." E. WADE & A.
BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (7th ed. 1965). The American founding fathers correctly
viewed the origins of the bills of rights in the procedures and institutions established to limit the
power of government. From this point of view, it is quite understandable that they looked for
precedents in the British constitutional traditions rather than in the history of French absolu-
tism. In fact, however, they overlooked the constitutional experience of other European coun-
tries which, like Poland, had four-and-a-half century-long traditions of struggle to restrain the
king's power and to create institutions fundamental to a constitutional government. In fact, the
Polish nobility had their "Habeas Corpus Act" much earlier than did the nobility of other Euro-
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Congress made no reference to the French constitutional experience,
with the exception of the consular convention and the letter to the
French National Assembly in relation to Franklin's death. France
was hardly mentioned during the first year of debates of the first U.S.
Congress.
VI. MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND
THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1791 COMPARED
The preamble of the American Constitution states that the people
of the United States ordained and established the Constitution. In
comparison, the Preamble of the French Constitution of 1791 appeals
to the National Assembly which wished to establish the French Con-
stitution upon the principles it has just recognized. These principles
were deemed to be declared by the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen, which was incorporated into the Constitution. The origi-
nal text of the Declaration referred to the representatives of the
French people, organized in National Assembly. The wording of the
preambles of these foremost political documents was recognized as
very telling. It was often raised that, contrary to the American Con-
stitution, which was established "by the people," the French act was
adopted by the people's representatives. The French National Constit-
uent Assembly had an exclusive pouvoir constituant. As R.R. Palmer
wrote, "[t]he Constituent Assembly, on finishing its work in 1791, did
not submit the new constitution to any form of popular ratification,
such as had occurred for the federal and some of the state constitu-
tions in America."' 24 This apparently clear-cut difference should not
be exaggerated; indeed, the analysis of the process of adoption and the
provisions on the revision or amendment of the constitutions show
more similarities than divergences.
The framers of both documents assumed that constitutions should
be drafted by special conventions to which the people delegated a con-
stituent power. In America, a draft of the Constitution was produced
by the Constitutional Convention and signed by thirty-nine of the
fifty-five delegates. It was submitted to the Congress which referred it
to conventions in the several states. Through the ratification process,
the draft was subject to nationwide discussion of the people. The work
of the French National Constituent Assembly was submitted to the
king who on September 28 proclaimed the Constitution as the law. In
pean countries and had its due process clause well established at the beginning of the fifteenth
century. See Ludwikowski, supra note 6, at 121.
124. R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 501.
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fact, however, the direct contribution of the people to the constitution-
making process in both countries was comparable.
The average attendance at the meetings of the Philadelphia Con-
vention was only about thirty and its debates were held behind closed
doors. 125 The public was not familiar with the issues and controver-
sies among the members of the Convention and was not given a chance
to participate in the constitutional debate before the ratification pro-
cess. The French Assembly numbered over eleven hundred deputies
and the constitutional principles were discussed in every house and
club in Paris; "there was no privacy in the chamber, the galleries
hooted and applauded as they chose."' 126 There was a general consen-
sus in France that to subject the Constitution to the further public
debate in the thousands of local electoral assemblies would mean "an-
archy and dissolution."'' 27 Consequently, the Constitution was not
sent to local constituencies, but its principles were publicly discussed
through the period of work of the National Constituent Assembly (28
June 1789 - 3 September 1791). Thus, the people's contribution to the
drafting process has to be recognized.
Commenting on the process of amending the Constitution,
Madison wrote:
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is
from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several
branches of government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly
consonant to the republican theory to recur to the same original author-
ity, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-
model the powers of government, but also whenever any one of the de-
partments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of
the others.'
28
The United States Constitution provides that the initiation of the
amending process would require a vote of two-thirds of both houses of
the Congress or the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the
several States. The amendments were to be ratified either by the legis-
latures or by special conventions of three-fourth of the States.
129
The French Constitution of 1791 also declares that only "the na-
tion has the imprescriptible right to change its Constitution.'
30
France, however, did not have a federal form of governmental organi-
zation; hence, the referral of important decisions to assemblees
125. C. SWISHER, supra note 9, at 30, 41.
126. R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 494.
127. Id. at 496.
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 347-48 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
129. U.S. CONST. art. V.
130. CONST. OF 1791 tit. VII (Fr.).
[Vol. 11:167
American and French Constitutions
primaires seemed unnecessary. The central legislative assembly was
deemed to represent the nation. "What is a nation?" Sieyes described
it as, "a body of associates living under a common law and represented
by the same legislature." 
31
To amend the Constitution, the future French National Legisla-
ture was expected to turn into an "Assembly of Revision." This As-
sembly was to be composed of the regular members of the national
legislative assembly augmented by one-third through the election of
delegates in the departments. An initiative to change the Constitution
had to be supported by three consecutive national legislatures. Their
decree for the convocation of the Assembly of Revision was not to be
subject to the sanction of the king, and the Constitution did not pro-
vide for any further ratification of the amendments.
People established constitutions and people were addressees of the
constitutional rights, but not all the people equally. The American
and French Constitutions were portrayed as democratic in contrast
with the non-democratic Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791, but the
term "democratic" in reference to both Constitutions requires
explanation.
Since the very moment of the adoption of the American Constitu-
tion, the American political system was proclaimed the most demo-
cratic in the world. The French Constitution retained monarchy but
its populist character has not been questioned. The Constitution was
adopted in the name of "the third estate," which Sieyes claimed to be
"a complete nation." 32 The Act of 1791 declared that "all powers
emanate from the nation."' 3 3 The framers of both Constitutions
claimed that the documents rested on the solid basis of the consent of
the people.
The Polish Constitution was adopted four months before the
French -Act and provided an apparently similar declaration. It pro-
claimed that "all power in the human community takes its origins in
the will of the nation." '' 34 Poland was, however, recognized as the
Commonwealth of the Nobility and the Constitution did not under-
mine the nobility's monopoly on political power. It declared that the
nobility would be favored "private and public life" and guaranteed all
131. Sieyes, What is the Third Estate?, in A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 42, 44 (J. Stewart ed. 1951) (emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 43.
133. CONST. OF 1791 tit. III, ch. 2 (Fr.).
134. U. RZADOWA Z DN 3-Go MAJA 1791 (M. Handelsman ed. 1791) [hereinafter POLISH
CONST. OF 1791], art. V, TRZY KONSTYTUCJE [Three Constitutions] 4 (1915) (English text pub-
lished separately by Polish Section of Int'l Ass'n Const. L. in 1985).
Fall 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
its liberties. The Polish Act introduced the burghers into the political
arena, but they could work actively only in the Seym (Polish Legisla-
tive Assembly) Commissions; they had "vocem activam" in matters
concerning towns and commerce and were "consulted" (vocem con-
sultivam) in other matters. The Polish Constitution was antiaris-
tocratic in the sense that it abolished the ranks and degrees of nobility,
but it did not abolish hereditary nobility as the French and American
Acts did. 135 Democracy in Poland was traditionally understood as
"democracy among nobility." On the one hand, the Polish Constitu-
tion was "non-democratic" in the sense that it limited the group of
addressees of political rights to a single social estate; on the other
hand, in comparison with West-European nations, the Polish nobility
was a particularly numerous social group; it constituted ten percent of
the whole population.
In fact, although the framers of the American and French Consti-
tutions opposed the "elitist" concept of the nation and did not disen-
franchise any single group of property owners, they did not put voters
and citizens on the same footing. "Democracy" in both the United
States and Western Europe did not mean universal suffrage. In the
words of one commentator,
"Democracy" was also termed "pure," "perfect," or "simple" democ-
racy, in order to keep it distinct from a democratic but representative
regime. Jefferson called it a "republic" or a "pure republic," and called
"government democratical but representative" the parliamentary regime
based on universal suffrage. Madison gave "democracy," the common
meaning and termed the representative system "republic"; thus the
United States was a republic and not a "democracy."1
36
In America, as in Poland, "people" were divided between active voters
and passive non-voters, and in theory, it was assumed that voters
would represent the interests of all people. 3 7 Although the qualifica-
tions for voters was left to the states and varied substantially, it could
be assumed that only about four-fifths of the adult white males in
America possessed the vote.1
38
The French Constitution associated the principles of royalism and
antiaristocratism with a representative government. "Individual wills
are the sole elements of the general will," wrote Sieyes, and in the
135. POLISH CONST. OF 1791, supra note 134, art. II; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; CONST.
OF 1791 preamble (Fr.); see also Decree Abolishing Hereditary Nobility and Titles of June 19,
1790.
136. Salvermini, The Concepts of Democracy and Liberty in the Eighteenth Century, in THE
CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 105, 106 (C. Read ed. 1938).
137. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 1 (1954).
138. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 400 (1966).
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period of the Constituent Assembly, his opinion prevailed.1 39 The
French Constitution proclaimed that the French political system was
representative, and that a body of associated individuals was to be rep-
resented by the national legislature and the king. Representatives
were not to be bound by the instructions of their constituencies. Sieyes
wrote, "Since they are the only depositaries of the general will, they
have no need to consult their constituents .. ". -140
The individuals, who were the subjects of constitutional rights,
however, were divided, as in the United States, into "passive citizens"
without the vote, and "active citizens," who had the right to vote.
"Active citizens" did not elect deputies to the national assembly di-
rectly. They voted for "electors," who solely, in fact, were granted full
political citizenship. To be an "active citizen" it was necessary to be a
Frenchman of at least twenty-five years of age, domiciled in the electo-
ral district and to pay a direct tax equal at least to the value of three
days' labor. An "active citizen" could be chosen as elector if he
owned a property equal to 200 days' labor or was a tenant of a dwell-
ing equal to the value of 150 days' labor. 141 All active citizens could
be elected representatives of the nation. It had been determined by the
Constituent Assembly that on May 27, 1791 there were 4,298,360 "ac-
tive citizens" in a population of between 25,000,000 and 26,000,000.
"I would judge," R.R. Palmer wrote,
that a quarter of adult males may have been excluded from the vote by
reason of poverty .... One is led to conclude, if the total of men over 25
was about 6,500,000, that almost seventy of them in a hundred had the
vote, about fifty in a hundred could serve as electors, and one in a hun-
dred could qualify as a national deputy, before August 1791.142
The constitutional systems of the countries that adopted the first con-
stitutions showed the constant tendency to extend voting rights; it
took, however, over a century for them to reach a level of universal
suffrage. In fact, it has to be admitted that it was Poland that first (of
the three countries) equated voters to adult citizens through the en-
franchisement of women in 1918. The Nineteenth Amendment en-
franchised women in the United States in 1920; the same right was
granted by France not before 1944.
The most impressive similarity of the first three constitutions was
always viewed in their adoption of the principle of the division of
power. The framework for the application of this principle was set by
139. Sieyes, supra note 131, at 50.
140. Id. at 54.
141. CONST. OF 1791 tit. III, ch. I, § 2, cl. 7 (Fr.).
142. R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 523, 526.
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Articles I, II, and III of the American Constitution, Article V of the
Polish Constitution, and Title III of the French Constitution. It was,
however, often raised that the doctrine of the division of powers was
applied differently by each of these constitutions.
America completed her struggle for independence before the adop-
tion of the Constitution, and liberty of the citizens did not seem to be
endangered by the abuses of executive power. Division of powers in
America was intended to protect the system established by the Consti-
tution against the domination of any single power. The Constitution
emphasized the separation of powers and worked out the elaborate
system of protective checks and balances. In fact, however, neither
Locke nor Montesquieu believed that the powers should be equal and
have no control or even influence over the acts of each other. 43 The
powers in the English model were neither equal nor well separated.
In Poland, the Constitution was adopted by the nobility whose lib-
erties did not require further protection. The Polish concept of the
division of powers entailed balancing the excessive freedom of the big
magnates and to strengthening the authority of the king. The critics of
the Polish Constitution argued frequently that, despite the declaration
that the highest authority was vested in the three powers, the whole
concept of the distribution, separation and balances of the main
"branches" of government was not accomplished. The Constitution
departed from the originally-considered "checks and balances" and
granted far superior power in the Seym.
In France, the division of powers was to impose efficient restraints
on the executive power and to protect citizens against the absolutism
of monarchs. On the other hand, the king already existed as a force
that could not be disregarded. 144 The Constitution of 1791 offered a
settlement by compromise. It confirmed that the person of the heredi-
tary monarch was inviolable and sacred; he was, however, bound by
law and proclaimed to be only a representative of a nation.
The French monarch was not as impotent as the Polish king but
far less powerful than the American president. The form of govern-
ment was declared to be monarchical and the executive power was
delegated to the king, and exercised under his authority by ministers
and other responsible agents. Contrary to the Polish Constitution,
which limited the king's selection of ministers and allowed the Seym
to vote them down, the French Constitution left the choice and dis-
missal of ministers solely to the king. Distinguishable from the Polish
143. See E. WADE & A. BRADLEY, supra note 123, at 25.
144. J. MOURNIER, CONSIDERATIONS SUR LES GOUVERNEMENTS ET PRINCIPALEMENT
SUR CELUI QUI CONVIENT A LA FRANCE 37-38 (1789).
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ministers who had guaranteed seats in the Senate, the French minis-
ters, like the officers of the American executive departments, could not
combine executive and legislative functions. On the other hand, Po-
lish as well as French ministers had to countersign the king's resolu-
tions, which otherwise were not executable.
The American and French Constitutions vested in the head of the
executive the power to veto the decisions of the legislature. The Polish
Constitution vested this right in the Senate, in which the king had only
one vote and a second vote in the case of a draw. The Polish Senate's
veto could be overruled by the Chamber of Deputies in the second
ballot at a subsequent session. The President of the United States'
veto can be overruled only by a vote of two-thirds of the members of
both houses of Congress. In France, there was a good deal of discus-
sion over whether the king should have an "absolute veto" or a "sus-
pensive veto" with a right to appeal to the people during successive
elections. After the king's announcement through Necker that he sup-
ported the idea of a "suspensive veto," the Assembly voted down the
absolute veto by a margin of 673 to 325.145 The Constitution provided
that when the two legislatures following the one in which the decree
was introduced have again successively presented same decree in the
same terms, the king shall be deemed to have given his sanction de-
spite the former refusal. 1
46
The French king, similar to the Polish monarch and the American
president, was the supreme head of the army and navy; also akin to
the American and Polish systems, the right to declare war was vested
in the legislative body. The French Constitution provided that, in the
event of imminent or actual hostilities, the king should immediately
notify the legislative body and cease hostilities upon the decision of the
Assembly. The American and the French Constitutions gave to the
heads of government the right to "maintain political relations abroad"
with the power to make treaties with "advice and consent of the two
thirds of Senate," in America and "subject to ratification by the legis-
lative body" in France. 147 The Polish Constitution emphasized more
strongly the control of the legislature over foreign relations. The Po-
lish monarch was prohibited "to conclude definitively any treaty, or
any diplomatic act and was only allowed to carry on temporary nego-
tiations with foreign Courts, and facilitate temporary occurrences, al-
ways with reference to the Diet."' 148 On the other hand, the Polish
145. R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 497.
146. CONST. OF 1791 tit. III, ch. III, § I, cl. I (Fr.).
147. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; CONST. OF 1791 tit. III, ch. III, § 1, cl. 1 (Fr.).
148. POLISH CONST. OF 1791, supra note 134, art. VII.
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monarch was offered a legislative initiative which he exercised to-
gether with his ministers (the Council of Guardians); the French king
did not have a direct initiative, he could only "invite the legislative
body to take a matter under consideration."
1 49
Unlike the American Congress and the Polish Seym, the French
Assembly became a single house. The lack of federal organization and
the fear of "the degrading yoke of aristocracy" in the upper house
defeated the bicameral principle.15
0
The French Assembly finally voted also in favor of the Sieyes' pro-
posal that the deputies would represent the entire nation and that they
could not receive any mandate from their constituencies.15 The simi-
lar instructions that normally were given to the deputies by the Polish
dietines were abolished by the Constitution of May 3, 1791. The legis-
lative functions were concentrated in the French National Assembly
and the functions of the primary and electoral assemblies were limited
to election.
All three Constitutions declared that the judiciary constituted a
separate branch which was distinguished from the other powers. Ac-
tually, the textual similarities of the Polish and the French Acts with
regard to the independence of the judiciary are quite striking: both
Constitutions proclaim that "the judicial power may not be employed
by the legislative body or the King but only by the elective magis-
trates." 152 The French Constitution incorporated the essentials of the
Decree Reorganizing the Judiciary of August 16, 1790. It placed at
the peak of the French judicial system a single Court of Cassation
which, upon the recognition of the violation of the rules of a proceed-
ing or the law, could quash the judgment and remand the case to the
lower courts. A National High Court was established as a court for
crimes against the security of the State. 53
VII. FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE AND AMERICAN
POLITICS AFTER 1789
The French Constitution of 1791 received favorable attention by
the American public. The House praised the constitution for its "wis-
149. CONST. OF 1791, tit. 111, ch. II, § 1, cl. I (Fr.).
150. J. MOUNIER, MOTIFS PRESENTES DANS LA SEANCE DE L'ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE DU
SEPTEMBRE 1789, AU NOM DU COMITE DE CONSTITUTION, SUR DIVERS ARTICLES DU PLAN
DU CORPS LEGISLATIF, ET PRINCIPALEMENT SUR LA NECESSITE DE LA SANCTION ROYALE
(published separately); quoted in R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 494.
151. CONST. OF 1791 tit. III, ch. I, § III, cl. 7 (Fr.).
152. POLISH CONST. OF 1791, supra note 134, art. VIII; CONST. OF 1791, tit. III, ch. V, § I
(Fr.).
153. CONST. OF 1791 (Fr.).
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dom and magnanimity," but the Senate withdrew "magnanimity"
from its statement and simply acknowledged the fact of adoption. 15
4
This symbolic gesture appeared to begin the process of the polariza-
tion of the positions taken by the commentators of the French events
who in the next years were to split distinctly into two groups: those
coupling and those separating the American and French Revolutions.
The first group, led by Paine and Jefferson, assumed and emphasized
that the French uprising was an "afterglow" of the American struggle
for liberty and had "produced incalculable blessings to [France]" and
promoted "interests of thousands."' 55 The second faction, which as-
sembled around Hamilton, preferred to believe that the Revolution in
Europe was the outbreak of an unruly and ignorant populace. They
believed that the French Revolution, particularly in its Jacobinian
stage, lacked legality and could endanger the achievement of the
American struggle for freedom.156 Hamiltonians were terrified by the
changing teams of the French leaders, general defiance of authority,
symptoms of anarchy and violence, and lack of security of property.
In their minds, the French Revolution discredited democracy. 15
7
Although the French Constitution of 1793 was widely criticized by
American statesmen, the public was still enthusiastic, mostly due to
the activity of the democratic societies which mushroomed all over the
country. These democratic clubs, which approved wholeheartedly all
that was happening in France, were able to hold for some time a large
part of the public opinion in favor of the French Revolution. In fact,
the activity of the societies intensified a critical reaction of the Wash-
ingtonian leaders and helped the Federalists neutralize pro-French
enthusiasm.
In 1793, the French Revolution became a major issue in American
politics. It contributed to the crystallization of the line that separated
the two emerging parties. 158 In 1793, when France began to seize
American ships, war seemed inevitable. In light of Jay's mission to
154. C. HAZEN, supra note 74, at 163. For critical comments of Gouverneur Morris, see G.
LYCAN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 138 (1970).
155. See A. MASON, supra note 74, at 420; D. MALONE, supra note 65, at 355-56; G. LYCAN,
supra note 154, at 132.
156. R.R. PALMER, supra note 65, at 525.
157. R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 58, 71; see also J. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 451 (1959).
158. J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801, at 99, 126 (1960). Although the split
between Jefferson and Hamilton was caused by a more general conflict of ideas and interests, the
process of emergence of the two parties was colored by the foreign policy issue. See D. MALONE,
supra note 65, at 445. For reaction of the French Ministers in the United States to the changing
attitudes toward France, see Letter from Jean Termant to Minister of Foreign Affairs (Jan. 12,
1793), reprinted in 2 CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FRENCH MINISTERS TO THE UNITED STATES
1791-1797, at 166-67 (F. Turner ed. 1904).
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England, the Federalists could celebrate at least temporary victory of
their anti-French politics. In fact, the contest between the two parties
blocked the influence of the French Revolution in America. Although
the French Constitution of 1795 was favorably construed as an at-
tempt to return to the patterns set by the American Revolution, the
momentum of French influence was lost. The Constitution of 1795
supplemented the Rights of Man with nine paragraphs on the duties of
the citizen. However, the subsequent Napoleonic constitutions were
more pragmatic, dropping the sections on the Rights of Man along
with a great quantity of the ideology that had sanctioned them. 59 As
David M. Potter wrote, "After the lapse of a few more years, Napo-
leon emerged as the supreme power in the land of liberty, equality, and
fraternity, and by that time even the most ardent American Jacobin
could no longer keep up the pretense that France was, merely applying
American beliefs in her own distinctively Gallic way."'
60
Concluding, it must be admitted that the French Revolution gener-
ated a multiplicity of emotions favorable to the search for new founda-
tions of a free government. It focused public attention on the struggle
for civil rights and liberties. In spite of the enormous emotional in-
volvement of the American public in French politics, the permanent
interflow of opinions between both countries, and the considerable
contribution of American political thought to the formation of the
French constitutional structures, the influence of the French revolu-
tionary documents on the American constitutional development re-
mained insignificant.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The question we are left with: Why and in what circumstances do
we make constitutions devaluated in our times? The constitution-
making process has become routine and every self-respecting nation
has sought to adopt a constitution. However, the answer to this sim-
ple question was not self-evident in the beginning of the constitutional
era, and the students of constitutional history cannot avoid asking why
the first written constitutions were adopted at approximately the same
time. Was this timing due to the considerable interflow of ideas be-
159. See Bruun, The Constitutional Cult in the Early Nineteenth Century, in THE CONSTITU-
TION RECONSIDERED 263-64 (C. Read ed. 1938). For the texts of the Constitutions of 1795 and
1799, see J. STEWART, supra note 103, at 571-612, 768-79.
160. Potter, People of Plenty, in A. MASON, supra note 74, at 890. Howard M. Jones ob-
served that "afterwards, when the British navy closed the seas, and our only source of informa-
tion about France was London, the prestige of the French steadily declined, so that from 1800 to
1815 the teaching of French in the United States fell off." H.M. JONES, supra note 68, at 216.
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tween the countries that created the first constitutions? Is the intellec-
tual background of the framers of these acts at least comparable?
Those who follow the "traumatic" approach to constitutional stud-
ies find a relatively easy explanation of the above-mentioned phenome-
non. In some dramatic moments of history, they argue, nations have
to make constitutional decisions. As Herbert J. Spiro wrote,
In the life of a political system, such fundamental decisions are made at
the time of its founding. They are expressed in documents like the Dec-
laration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. De-
cisions of highest importance may also be made in the course of a violent
or peaceful revolution, or as the result of a war. Many decisions of such
basic importance have had to be made all over the world, especially dur-
ing the last hundred years: recently they have had to be made with in-
creasing frequency. 161
Following this approach, it was argued that the emergence of the
American Constitution was stimulated by the War of Independence.
The French Revolution and the First Partition of Poland accelerated
the constitution-making processes in France and Poland. The Spanish
Constitution of 1812 was promulgated in the midst of the War of Inde-
pendence against French domination. The Norwegian Constitution of
1814 was idopted in opposition to the Treaty of Kiel (January 14,
1814), which renounced the sovereignty of Norway in favor of its
union with Sweden. We can multiply these examples. The point is
that for those who follow this approach, the question about the "tim-
ing" of the first constitutional works does not make any sense. The
adoption of a constitution is due to local geopolitical circumstances,
and the framing of several constitutions at approximately the same
time is simply coincidental.
The explanatory value of the 'traumatic' approach is far from satis-
factory, and its applicability to historical constitutional studies re-
quires careful verification. The history of every nation is abundant in
dramatic events that in some way can be used as all-explanatory in-
struments. Reviewing the above-mentioned examples, one has to ad-
mit that of the first three written constitutions only the French one
shows the direct and unquestionable links with dramatic, revolution-
ary events. The links of the American Constitution with the War of
Independence are not doubtful, but are less direct: The constitutional
consciousness grew with the rise of the American Union and was more
directly effected by the failure of the Confederation and the defects of
the Articles of Confederation than by the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, which was adopted eleven years before the promulgation of the
161. H. SPIRO, GOVERNMENT BY CONSTITUTION 5 (1959).
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Constitution. The First Partition of Poland (1772) stimulated the ef-
forts of the movement for reform of the Polish political system but,
similar to the situation of the United States, this dramatic event oc-
curred nineteen years before the Constitution was adopted. This pe-
riod was bundant in political, social and intellectual events not less
significant for the constitution-making process than the dramatic loss
of territory.
As argued many times in this article, the complexity of the consti-
tution-making process can be successfully comprehended only on the
basis of sound studies of many correlated factors. While the dramatic
political events can enable, speed up, or necessitate the constitutional
decisions, they can hardly provide information, knowledge, or experi-
ence indispensable for the successful completion of constitutional
works. The study of the development of the first constitutions shows
convincingly that the first written "basic laws" simply did not emerge
during a period of national trauma. While the dissemination of the
constitutional experience currently makes possible the quick adoption
of well-tested constitutional principles, the successful formation of the
first constitutional movements required time, constitutional traditions,
and the impressive interflow of political, social and philosophical
ideas. It demanded the development of the constitutional conscious-
ness, the set of attitudes, beliefs and feelings about government, distri-
bution of powers, rights and duties of citizens, their relationships to
the ruling structures, and particularly, their participation in politics.
Constitutional consciousness can emerge only in the lengthy pro-
cess of shaping political feelings and attitudes. Knowledge and experi-
ments as well as failures and successes are required to develop
institutions and procedures that are able to limit the arbitrariness of
power and regulate social and political relations. Even those constitu-
tions that are not adopted, but granted by the rulers, demand some
knowledge, maturity, and social pressure. Time is required to reach a
necessary social consensus. Although the durability and maturity of
constitutional traditions always affect the value of the constitutional
structures, one may argue that the time factor has become less impor-
tant with the growth of a world-wide constitutional experience. Yet,
at the commencement of the constitutional era, the maturity of the
constitutional traditions was a "condition sine qua non" of the suc-
cessful constitutional works.
The success of the first constitutional works is largely attributable
to the mature intellectual background of the constitutional drafters,
and to their ability to draw from the experience of other nations. It
required the appropriate channels of information that could facilitate
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the exchange of ideas between the nations that began to test the first
constitutional structures. The significant interflow of opinions be-
tween eighteenth-century Europe and America allowed the drafters of
the constitutional acts to rest their constitutional structures on similar
principles without depriving the first constitutions of their national
tincture; it made the first constitutions distinct but similar.
